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I. INTRODUCTION'
As one federal judge so astutely predicted two decades ago:
It may well be that Judge Charles E. Clark and the framers of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could not foresee the computer
age. However, we know we now live in an era when much of the
data which our society desires to retain is stored in computer discs.
This process will escalate in years to come; we suspect that by the
year 2000 virtually all data will be stored in some form of
computer memory.
The 1980 prediction was not too far off.
In our high-tech era, a body of law3 has evolved regarding the
parameters of the preservation, collection, and production of
electronic evidence.4  This Essay discusses the application of
1. The authors wish to thank Michelle van Wiggeren and Steve Goldberg for their
invaluable help in updating and revising the predecessor of this Essay, Professionalism in
CyberDiscovery; The Proper Course for Retaining and Producing Electronic Documents,
originally written and copyrighted in 1999 by Lisa M. Arent.
2. National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasis added). Only .003% of the unique information produced annually by
the world is in printed documents. A study, titled How Much Information and published in
2000, by the faculty and students at the School of Information Management and Systems at the
University of California at Berkeley reported:
The world produces between I and 2 exabytes of unique information per year,
which is roughly 250 megabytes for every man, woman, and child on earth. An
exabyte is a billion gigabytes, or 1018 bytes. Printed documents of all kinds
comprise only .003% of the total. Magnetic storage is by far the largest medium
for storing information and is the most rapidly growing, with shipped hard drive
capacity doubling every year. Magnetic storage is rapidly becoming the
universal medium for information storage.
Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information, (October 18, 2000) at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info/index.html.
3. An excellent and up-to-date compilation ("organized [both] by jurisdiction and by
topic") of electronic discovery case blurbs is maintained by Kroll On Track at its Case Law List
page. Kroll On Track, at http://www.krollontrack.com/LawLibrary/CaselawList (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002). Other helpful resources include the "Library-Digital Discovery" list maintained
by Harvard Law School and the "Electronic Discovery" case list maintained by CoreFacts. The
Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Library - Digital Discovery, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/digitaldiscovery/library.html (last visited Dec 1, 2002); CoreFacts,
Electronic Discovery, at
http://www.corefacts.net/electronicdiscovery/electronicdiscoverymain.htm (last visited
October 23, 2002).
4. "The U.S. market for electronic discovery services is 'probably a couple billion
dollars' in the near term.., and in the next three to four years ... will probably grow to 'several
billion dollars,' with the international market adding another 25 to 50 percent," according to the
associate director of a $10 billion venture capital firm that invested in a provider of electronic
services to law firms. Aliza Earnshaw, Fios Investors See Big Market For Local Finn, BUS. J.
2002] EDISCO VERY. ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
discovery rules and common law discovery principles to electronic
information issues.
II. PRESERVATION AND COLLECTION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
A. The Duty to Preserve Evidence
1. Preservation Obligations in the Electronic Context
A party has a duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence.
Evidence includes all forms of information, not only hard-copy
documents,5 but also electronic information stored on a computer, in a
database, or in any other electronic format. A requesting party is
entitled to obtain discoverable information from an electronic source
to the same extent as from a filing cabinet.6  In each situation, the
responding party must determine the potential sources and locations
of responsive information and then conduct a diligent search for
responsive materials.
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the term
"document" broadly, to include information in any tangible format.7
Although discovery of electronic data has become an issue of
increased interest and concern over the last several years, the notion
that computer data is discoverable is not new. In 1970, Congress
PORTLAND, July 20, 2001, available at
http://portland.bizjoumals.com/portlandlstories/2001/07/23/story6.html.
5. The older discovery terminology "document" is confusing and misleading in the
current world, where the vast majority of information is electronic and is never contained in
documents. Courts and parties can be misled by references to documents when discussing
relevance, admissibility, the duty to preserve, and the obligation to produce. Litigants' and
potential litigants' obligations relate to information. Thus, it would be desirable to have the
procedural rles refer to "information" requests rather than "document" requests.
6. Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16,
1999). See also Jones v. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, *17 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002)
(discoverability's legal framework applies to requests for electronic or computer-based
information just as it applies to more traditional materials). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2218 at 451 (2d ed. 1994).
7. Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encompasses "documents (including
writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phonorecords, and other data compilations from
which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection
devices into reasonably usable form)." FED. R. Ctv. P. 34(a). Rule 34 also enables a party to
seek "to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters
within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party
upon whom the request is served."
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modified Rule 34 to explicate that the term "documents"
encompassed more than just hardcopies. 8
Neither of the California Discovery Act provisions regarding the
production of "documents and tangible things" defines "document."
9
Instead, in all Discovery Act sections, by virtue of section 2016(b)(3)
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, "document" is coextensive
with "writing" as defined in section 250 of the California Evidence
Code. Section 250 defines "writing" as "handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of
recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or
representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols,
or combinations thereof." That definition has been interpreted
broadly to include information in electronic form.' °
The broad definition of "documents" typically used in requests
for production encompasses information stored on computers and on
computer media, such as floppy disks, zip drives, jaz drives," and
archival/emergency storage devices (such as back-up tapes). 12
Moreover, electronic versions of documents can contain additional,
8. The 1970 Advisory Committee Notes provide that Rule 34 encompasses "electronic
data compilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of detection
devices." "[W]hen the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party
only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to translate
the data into usable form." FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). "[C]ourts have ample power under Rule 26(c)
to protect respondent against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or
requiring that the discovering party pay costs. [I]f the discovering party needs to check the
electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent with respect to preservation of his
records, confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters, and costs." Id. See generally Hon. Shim A.
Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to
the Task? 41 B.C. L. REV. 327 (2000).
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 2031 (West 2001) (inspection and copying of documents
and tangible things in possession, custody, or control of another party to the action); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE. § 2020 (inspection and copying of nonparty's documents and tangible things).
10. Aguimatang v. California State Lottery, 234 Cal. App. 3d 769, 798 (1991)
(computer's magnetic tapes constituted "writing" under section 250). See also MICHAEL R.
OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA § 3.05[A] (Robin Kojima et al.
eds., 1999).
11. A "jaz drive" is "a removable disk drive" developed by Iomega Corporation. It
"holds up to 2 gigabytes of data. The fast data rates and large storage capacity make it a viable
alternative for backup storage as well as everyday use." Iomega, Iomega Products, at
http://www.iomega.com/na/products (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
12. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1993) (raw computer data
constitutes discoverable documents that must be produced, even though producing party could
not access the data); R.S. Creative v. Creative Cotton, Ltd., 75 Cal. App. 4th 486, 489 (1999)
(definition of "document" for purposes of production request "included computer tapes, discs
and any information stored in a computer"); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 1999 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 240 (Super. Ct. June 16,1999) ("documents"-as defined in preservation order and in
subsequent document requests--encompassed data contained on back-up tapes).
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non-printed information, such as the dates of creation, access and/or
modification and, if relevant, sending and receiving details.
13
2. Nature and Consequences of Duty to Preserve
The responding party's failure to preserve evidence or
destruction of evidence can lead to a variety of adverse consequences.
It may preclude the requesting party from obtaining otherwise
relevant or discoverable evidence; it may harm the integrity of the
court proceedings; and it may ultimately harm the blameworthy party.
a. Ethical Obligations
When conducting discovery, an attorney should keep in mind
several principles set forth in the ethics rules. Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(c)-(d) proscribes "dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation [or] conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.' 14
As to the production of evidence, Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.4(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct
another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or
conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value [; and] ... shall not counsel or assist another person to do any
such act[.]" 15
13. Public Citizen v. Carlin, 184 F.3d 900, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (paper printout of e-mail
record not "extra copy" under 44 U.S.C. § 3301 if it does not include transmission data, such as
names and addresses of recipient and author and date message sent), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1003
(2000); Armstrong v. EOP, 1 F.3d 1274, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1993). One category of potentially
discoverable information beyond this Essay's scope is customer identifying information
maintained by Internet Service Providers ("ISP's"). See generally Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.,
140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (granting motion to quash subpoena; using First
Amendment to reject request to reveal names of 23 individuals who posted, in online chat room,
supposedly harmful messages about requesting company); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775
A. 2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) (upholding lower court ruling that corporation/defamation-
plaintiff could not obtain identity of message-board-poster); Fenwick & West, Privacy &
Information Security: Anonymity Online, at
http://www.fenwick.com/AboutFenwick/Privacy_LawResources.htm#Anonymity (last
modified Dec. 1, 2002) (listing other anonymity on-line decisions).
14. See also CAL. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 5-200(A) (a lawyer "[s]hall employ, for
the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to the member[,] such means only as are
consistent with truth; [and s]hall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law").
15. Cf MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) ("[a] lawyer shall not
suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce"); CAL.
RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 5-220.
2002]
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b. Sanctions
Depending upon the nature of the conduct, including the degree
of culpability, the ramifications in a civil litigation can include:
monetary penalties (such as attorney fees, costs and/or pay-for-proof
sanctions), exclusion of evidence, adverse inference jury
instructions, 16 and even a dismissal or default judgment. The Second
Circuit recently analyzed the requisite "culpable state of mind,"'
' 7
finding that "discovery sanctions, including an adverse inference
instruction, may be imposed where a party has breached a discovery
obligation not only through bad faith or gross negligence, but also
through ordinary negligence." 
1 8
c. Potential Criminal Penalties
Under federal law, it is a crime to obstruct justice by
"threaten[ing] or corruptly persuad[ing] another person... with intent
to... cause or induce any person to alter, destroy, mutilate, or
conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding."1 9 To be discussed infra
in section II(A)(2), a party's responsibility to preserve evidence
begins when litigation can reasonably be anticipated, rather than at
the moment process is served.
A fundamental misunderstanding or misconstruction of that
principle has proved devastating for Arthur Andersen LLP in the now
infamous Enron case. Andersen, Enron's internal and external
auditor, was recently convicted on a federal obstruction/ tampering
16. See Trigon, Inc. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277 (E.D. Va. 2001) (finding in
corporate taxpayer's refund action Government's retained litigdtion consulting-company
willfully and intentionally destroyed testifying experts' draft reports and correspondence, such
that adverse inferences and other sanctions warranted); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d
859, 877 (N.D. 1I. 2001), (at bench trial "defendants' spoliation of evidence on their computer
support[ed] a negative inference that defendants destroyed evidence of misappropriation" of
trade secrets; "highly suspicious" deletions and defragmentation constituted "circumstantial
evidence" of misappropriation), mot. for new trial denied, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7974 (N.D.
Ill. May 2, 2002). Even absent formal sanctions for spoliation of evidence, at trial a party might
get some mileage from an opponent's misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d
140, 156-57 (5th Cir. 2000) (in spite of denial of requested adverse inference instruction,
defendant still could attack prosecution's failure to seize informant's computer, which then
incurred data loss when informant installed new Windows '95 program), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
959 (2001).
17. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20422,
*21-22 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating jury verdict and remanding for reconsideration of whether
Plaintiff's failure to timely or fully produce e-mail back-up tapes warranted adverse jury
instruction).
18. Id. at *4.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (b)(2) (2000).
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charge.20  The criminal prosecution and a number of parallel civil
lawsuits2' have been based on allegations that, while anticipating
litigation, Andersen persuaded employees to shred Enron documents.
Andersen correctly anticipated litigation-and government
investigations-shortly before the issuance of a press release
disclosing that Enron's shareholder equity would be reduced by $1.2
billion.2 A week before issuing the release, Andersen, "which had an
internal department of lawyers for routine legal matters, had retained
an experienced New York law firm to handle future Enron-related
litigation. 23  The Andersen indictment charged that these facts
demonstrated Andersen was on notice of the obligation to preserve
evidence in anticipation of litigation. The indictment alleged that
Andersen then embarked on an enormous spoliation effort.24 In
particular, it charged that, after weeks of shredding, "members of the
Andersen team on the Enron audit were alerted finally that there
could be 'no more shredding' because the firm had been 'officially
served' [with a request] for documents. ' 2s
Under state law, obstruction based on spoliation can also lead to
criminal liability. For example, in California, one commits a
misdemeanor if, "knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in
20. See Indictment in United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. CRH-02-121 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 7, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usandersenO30702ind.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
21. See, e.g., the Complaints in:
* Severed Enron Employees Coalition v. Northern Trust Co, No. H-02-0267 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 28, 2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/seecntrust01 2402cmp.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2002);
" Amalgamated Bank v. Lay, et al., consolidated into No. H-01-3624 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 4, 2001), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/amlgmtd 120401 cmp.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2002); and
* Abrams v. Enron Corp., et al., No. H-01-3630 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2001) (amended
complaint), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/abrmsenronl 11301 cmp.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2002).
22. Indictment in United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. CRH-02-121, at 5, para. 8.,
available at http://news.findlaw.comihdocs/docs/enron/usandersen030702ind.pdf (last visited
October 7, 2002).
23. Id.
24. Id. (alleging that "an unparalleled initiative was undertaken to shred physical
documentation and delete computer files .... The shredder at the Andersen office at the Enron
building was used virtually constantly .... A systematic effort was also undertaken and carried
out to purge the computer hard-drives and E-mail system of Enron-related files.").
25. Id. at 6. para. 12.
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writing, or other matter or thing, is about to be produced in evidence
upon any trial, inquiry, or investigation... willfully destroys, or
conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being
produced."
26
3. When the Duty Arises
The duty to preserve evidence arises or expands upon the
reasonable anticipation of litigation; receipt of pre-litigation
correspondence; or service of the complaint, the answer, or discovery
requests.
a. Pre-Litigation
Many courts have recognized a duty to preserve evidence that
one knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant to pending,
imminent, or reasonably foreseeable litigation.27 In analyzing that
duty, one California appellate court explained that "the character
of... document destruction-whether illegal, unfair, immoral or
not-is tied to, among other things, its timing., 28  That court
described a "liability continuum" for destruction of evidence,
beginning with the most egregious situation, namely documents about
to be introduced into evidence at trial.29 On the least culpable end of
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 2002).
27. The preservation obligation arises upon "notice that.., evidence is relevant to
litigation-most commonly when suit has already been filed... but also on occasion in other
circumstances, as for example when a party should have known that the evidence may be
relevant to future litigation." Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)
(reversing summary judgment because jury could draw adverse inference from individual
defendant's destruction of documents). See also Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 29, 39
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Obviously service of a discovery demand places a party on notice to preserve
the materials explicitly requested, but the duty to preserve arises whenever a party has been
served with a complaint or anticipates litigation." (citations omitted)) vacated in part on other
grounds, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606 (2001); Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 879,
888-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[C]omplaint itself may alert a party that certain information is
relevant and likely to be sought in discovery") (citing Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142
F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("obligation to preserve evidence even arises prior to the filing of
a complaint where a party is on notice that litigation is likely to be commenced"); Winters v.
Textron, 187 F.R.D. 518, 520 (M.D. Pa. 1999) ("litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence
which it knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action .... [K]nowledge of a
potential claim is deemed sufficient to impose a duty to preserve evidence.").
28. Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the
express prohibition of California Penal Code § 135).
29. California case law imposes sanctions for willful pre-litigation destruction of
evidence that a putative defendant knew or should have known would have been relevant in a
litigation. Id. at 624-25 (citing, e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F.
Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (sanctions appropriate where litigant has destroyed
information it was on notice was "relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or. . . reasonably
calculated to lead to ... discovery of admissible evidence).
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that continuum, "there is no liability for failing to preserve documents
before a party has notice of their relevance to litigation likely to be
commenced., 30 Whether a particular destruction situation ends up on
that spectrum can depend on various factors, such as length of the
pre-litigation period and the number of prior similar claims.3'
b. After Service of Complaint
At a minimum, it is generally accepted that: "[s]ervice of a
complaint puts the receiving party on notice that it is required to
preserve evidence that may be relevant to the claims asserted., 32 That
obligation arises before receipt of a production request.33
c. Once Discovery Process has Begun
The responsibility not to lose or destroy pertinent information
intensifies once the discovery process is under way. For example,
under the California Code of Civil Procedure, "[m]isuses of the
discovery process [for which sanctions may be imposed] include, but
are not limited to:
*"Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of
discovery."
*"Making an evasive response to discovery."
30. Id. at 625.
31. See id. at 626 (concluding that the facts before it fit within the last category, namely
alleged spoliation too remotely relevant to justify the imposition of tort liability). Given the
evidence's disclosure of only one accident similar to plaintiff's and in light of the lengthy
passage of time, the trial court had erred in submitting to the jury plaintiffs cause of action for
intentional spoliation of evidence. Id. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d
511 (1998), the Supreme Court of California subsequently rejected Willard's approval of the
potential for tort liability for spoliation.
32. New York State NOW v. Cuomo, No. 93 Civ. 7146, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10520,
*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998), claim dismissed on other grounds, New York State NOW v.
Pataki, 261 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1066 (2002). See Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855, 867 n. 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that a
litigating party "a duty not to lose or destroy evidence relevant to the lawsuit."). See also
MICHAEL R. OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA § 6.02 (Robin
Kojima et al. eds., 1999) (citing Coca-Cola Bottling as authority for the existence of the duty to
preserve evidence in litigation).
33. New York State NOW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10520 at *5 ("immaterial that the first
document requests were not served until after the records were apparently destroyed"); Cedars-
Sinai, 954 P.2d at 517 (destroying evidence in anticipation of discovery request would be
misuse of discovery).
2002]
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*"Disobeying a court order to provide discovery. 34
4. What Must be Preserved
Once a complaint is filed, a litigant is obligated "to preserve
what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,
is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the
subject of a pending discovery request., 35  Generally speaking, a
party should preserve those categories of evidence that it reasonably
anticipates may later become relevant.36  For example, if the
defendant's business division and that division's product were
mentioned repeatedly and prominently throughout the plaintiffs
complaint and requests for production, the defendant is obliged to
preserve that division's sales correspondence and the like.37
5. Attorney's and Client's Notification Obligations
Attorneys "have a duty to advise their clients of pending
litigation and of the requirement to preserve potentially relevant
evidence." 38  The most thorough communication would inform a
34. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (a)(4),(6)-(7) (West 2002). See also Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("[d]estroying evidence
in response to a discovery request ... would surely be a misuse of discovery within the meaning
of section 2023 [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE], as would such destruction in anticipation of a
discovery request"); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353, 360-61
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (dismissing the complaint and imposing monetary sanctions under § 2023
[CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE] for Plaintiffs' destruction of computer files during discovery).
Based on the availability of such sanctions under section 2023, the Supreme Court of California
has declined to recognize a tort cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence by a party.
Cedars-Sinai, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248.
35. Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984). See also Danis v. USN Communics, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16900, at *99 (N.D. 111. Oct. 20, 2000) (quoting Win. T. Thompson, Co.); China Ocean Shipping
Co. v. Simone Metals Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16264, at *12 (N.D. 11. Sept.
30, 1999) ("duty to preserve evidence includes any relevant evidence over which the non-
preserving entity had control and reasonably knew or could reasonably foresee was material to a
potential legal action"); Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 127 (S.D. Fla.
1987); Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
36. Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis
14053, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1996).
37. Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 109-10 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
38. New York State NOW v. Cuomo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10520, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July
14, 1998) (while failure to instruct defendant to retain documents in period between service of
complaint and receipt of document requests potentially exposes counsel to sanctions, declining
to impose sanctions where document destruction was neither in bad faith nor prejudicial to
plaintiff) (citing Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)(counsel has a "duty to advise his client of the type of information potentially relevant to
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client of the range of potential negative consequences of document
and data destruction or deletion, including contempt of court, civil
and criminal39  penalties, default judgment,40  or dismissal.
In turn, corporate representatives are obliged to adequately
identify the underlying subject matter and to provide guidance to
employees as to the scope of retention, especially when mandated by
a preservation order. 41 Notice of the preservation obligation should
be disseminated in a manner most likely to reach the employees-for
example, in hard-copy form as well as by e-mail.42 In the event a
relevant dispute ensues, it would be helpful to have proof of such
notices, as well as a record of when and how they were
communicated.
A court may impose severe sanctions, including entry of a
default judgment, for a party's failure to ensure that a preservation
order is implemented and followed.43 Some cautionary tales emanate
from three federal district court decisions. In a New Jersey federal
class action, subsequent to defendant corporation's feeble and
the lawsuit and of the necessity of preventing its destruction")).
39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 2002) (possibility of misdemeanor
conviction for destruction of relevant evidence).
40. Telectron, 116 F.R.D. at 109-10 (imposing default judgment based on defendant's
corporate counsel's egregious conduct on day Complaint filed, namely instructing all employees
to immediately destroy all sales correspondence over two years old generated by pertinent
division of defendant company).
41. Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 73 ("obligation to retain discoverable materials is an
affirmative one; it requires that the agency or corporate officers having notice of discovery
obligations communicate those obligations to employees in possession of discoverable
materials"). One federal district court imposed a monetary sanction of $1 million for a
corporation's failure to adequately inform employees about the existence of a class action, a
preservation order and the obligation to preserve evidence. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 600, 617 (D.N.J. 1997) (lawsuit relating to practices in
sale of life insurance). In Prudential, senior management had not directed the dissemination of
a preservation order to employees. Prudential, 169 F.R.D. at 612. In addition, the e-mails sent
by management did not mention the pending class action or the court's order; nor did those e-
mails describe the potential penalties for contempt of court for destruction of evidence. Id.
42. In Prudential, although various pertinent e-mail messages were sent, many employees
did not, or could not, read e-mail and thus did not receive the communications. Prudential, 169
F.R.D. at 613. Therefore, the use of e-mail communications was ineffective and failed to
implement the court's preservation order. Id.
43. See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Prods., Ltd., 43 F. Supp. 2d 951
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (while noting that facts could have supported a contempt finding, awarding
reasonable attorney fees, expert fees and costs due to lack of compliance with order to preserve
integrity of computers); Win. T. Thompson Co., 593 F. Supp. at 1456 (striking GNC's answer
and dismissing GNC's complaint in another action). Cf Lang v. Hochman, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming imposition of "terminating sanctions" and entry of $22 million
default judgment against defendants after they failed to comply with three discovery orders
requiring production of electronic files and other documents).
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deficient notification, four of the defendant's field offices destroyed
unauthorized sales materials as part of routine document
destruction.4 The court chastised management for failing to take an
active role in formulating, implementing, or communicating a
document retention policy. 45  Defendant's "haphazard and
uncoordinated approach to document retention indisputably denied
the party opponent potential evidence to establish facts in dispute. ' ' 6
Thus, the court drew the inference that the destroyed materials were
relevant and, if available, would have led to successful proof of the
claim.
47
In an earlier case, the Central District of California struck
defendant corporation's answer based on flagrant lack of compliance
with a prior court order requiring the preservation of all purchase,
sale, and inventory records maintained in the ordinary course of
business.4 8  Neither defendant's management nor its counsel had
instructed employees to preserve such records. Indeed, the president
issued a memorandum to all personnel advising that the court order
did not require any change in the company's standard document
retention/destruction policies or practices. The court found that the
course of conduct before and after the preservation order had
condoned practices that precipitated the bad faith destruction of
critical evidence.49
Separate and apart from the litigation ramifications, corporate
officers can be held personally responsible for a corporation's failure
to preserve relevant evidence. For example, in one case the court
imposed a $10,000 fine on the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for
breach of the duty to preserve.50 In that case, the CEO had delegated
to the company's "inexperienced" general counsel the entire
responsibility for implementing a document preservation plan.5' In
44. Prudential, 169 F.R.D. at 615.
45. Upon entry of the document preservation order, "it became the obligation of senior
management to initiate a comprehensive document preservation plan and to distribute it to all
employees." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Thompson, 593 F. Supp. at 1447.
49. Id. at 1447-48. Both before and after the entry of the preservation order, there had
been a lack of preservation and a "failure to implement procedures to monitor or control
document destruction." ld at 1454. In addition, after the entry of the order, Defendant had only
preserved relatively useless bulk cash register tapes and store order strips and erased computer
tapes and disks that could have easily retained some of the stored information. Id.
50. Danis v. USN Communics, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16900 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23,
2000).
51. Id.
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turn, the general counsel had neglected to develop specific retention
criteria, to inform all employees in writing of the preservation duty, or
to give written notice to employees of spoliation's consequences.
B. Scope of Preservation Duty -"Deleted" Files and Back-up
Tapes
In some cases, a party serves a letter requesting that its opponent
preserve all electronic information, including deleted files and file
fragments, and cease modifying or deleting electronic information
relating to pertinent topics. "Plaintiffs have increasingly been
demanding preservation of 'all' electronic data, including every single
daily backup tape and file on a company system.,
52
1. "Deleted" Files
"Deleted" does not necessarily mean gone forever. Computer
files that are deleted by the user are designated for deletion but remain
on the system until they are overwritten randomly as the system needs
the space. So, at any given time, a computer's hard drive may contain
"deleted" data that can be recovered. A sector-for-sector or copy of
the hard drive will pick up any deleted files or file fragments that
remain. 53 In contrast, a file-for-file copy of a hard drive does not pick
up deleted files or file fragments, and some imaging programs
overwrite some of the deleted files.
54
52. Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc., A Balancing Act: Determining the Proper Level
of Electronic Data Preservation, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (June 1998), available at
http://www.eedinc.com/staticcontent/resourceLibrary/RD/20June/2098.pdf. See also Hon.
James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Delete Key, 3 THE GREEN BAG 393 (Summer 2000)
(observing that the "once-arcane fact [that nothing is truly deleted via the Delete key] has
spawned a new legal industry: the mining of e-mails, computer files, and especially copies of
hard drives to obtain deleted material"). Note though, too an overly broad request can do more
harm than good when one eventually appears before a judge on a discovery motion.
53. New Technologies, Inc.'s (NTI's) SafeBack software enables sector-by-sector
copying via insertion into the target computer of a special bootable floppy disk that then pours
the data out to a hard disk attached via the serial or parallel port. New Technologies, Inc.,
Safeback Mirror Image Backup Software, at http://www.forensics-intl.com/safeback.html (last
visited Dec. 5, 2002). Logicube's Forensic SF 500 is a disk-copying device useable when one
can remove the target hard drive from the computer. Logicube, Inc., Forensic SF 500, at
http://www.logicube.com/store/forensic.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2002). See also Damian
Tsoutsouris, Computer Forensic Legal Standards and Equipment, System Administration,
Networking and Security Institute, at http://rr.sans.org/incident.legalstandards.php (last visited
Oct. 23, 2002) (describing a prior iteration of the Forensic SF 500 as "a hardware/software
combination [that] has proven to be very effective.").
54. One should be careful to use the technically accurate terminology. The literature and
cases refer to "imaging" a disk to preserve copies of deleted files and fragments. In fact, two of
the more popular "imaging" programs each defragments a disk before copying it, thus
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a. Court-Ordered Hard Drive Searches
Does the obligation to search for and produce responsive
computer data require a search for "deleted" files? 55  Case law does
not advise whether a diligent search for responsive information
requires a search for deleted files. Yet, there have been cases in
which a party successfully sought access to his opponent's computer
to search for deleted files. If there is concrete evidence of destruction
of electronic information, along with a basis for believing that such
information may be discovered through a "deleted" file search of a
hard drive, a court may grant such a request. However, the requesting
party must: 1) establish that the burden and intrusion are justified by
the need, and 2) show a reasonable basis for concluding that the
search will turn up otherwise unavailable, responsive information.56
At least three court decisions have granted requests for access to
their opponents' computers.57  It is not entirely clear whether there
overwriting some or all deleted files.
55. Parties' obligation to preserve electronic information does not necessarily extend to
files deleted in the regular course of business. ABA Litigation Task Force Civil Discovery
Standards 29(a)(iii) (Aug. 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/standards.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2002) (unless
requesting party can demonstrate substantial need, ordinarily no duty "to try to restore electronic
information... deleted or discarded in the regular course... but [maybe not] completely
erased").
56. See Fennell v. First Steps Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996) (denying request
to copy opponent's hard drive because no showing of particularized likelihood that information
sought would be uncovered); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90 (D.
Colo. 1996) (rejecting argument that defendant should have made a copy of employee's hard
drive to preserve data designated for deletion; plaintiff later obtained access to computer hard
drive to find deleted data, but its computer technician bungled the search); Strasser v.
Yalamanchi, 69 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (denying access to opponent's hard
drive to search for "purged" financial data in light of failure to prove likelihood of recovery).
57. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (appointing
neutral expert to copy defendant's personal computer hard drive-due to evidence of
defendant's deletion of e-mails responsive to plaintiff's document production request and
likelihood of recovery), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part on other grounds, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir.
2002) (without addressing any discovery issues, partially affirming summary judgment as to
trademark claims); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(appointing neutral expert to recover "deleted" files from computers, including home computers,
used by defendant's employees), supp'd by, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15,
2000); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Local 2000 Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Civ. Action No.
00-08 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2000) (appointing neutral expert to examine and copy information and
communications on home and office computer hard drives belonging to defendants, who were
union officers and rank-and-file union members), at
http://www.fenwick.com/pub/litpubs/electronic/EDExhA.pdf.
Some of the described facts from Northwest Airlines are from Kenneth J. Withers,
Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, 2000 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2 (Oct. 2000),
at http://www.fclr.org/2000fedctslrev2.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2002). See also Fenwick &
West, Order on Defendants' Motion for Protective Order & Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
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was concrete evidence of data destruction in two of those cases.58 In
contrast, the third case did involve actual data destructioni 9 In any
event, taken together, these three cases arguably represent a trend in
federal courts to appoint neutral experts to copy hard drives and
attempt to recover deleted data.
When a neutral computer forensics expert successfully flushes
out a party's illicit tampering with e-mails, appropriate sanctions may
very well follow. 60 In one such case, the neutral expert confirmed that
plaintiff had submitted an altered e-mail in opposition to a motion.61
The court dismissed the complaint, ordering the plaintiff to reimburse
defendants for their portion of the expert's fee, and for attorney fees
and costs reasonably connected to discovering the fraud perpetrated
on the court. The court ruled that "[t]he ability to discover fraud...
particularly sophisticated computer fraud, is greatly limited. Thus,
the imposition of strong sanctions is one of the very few ways of
deterring such activity in the future. This Court intends such a
message here."62
In a more recent decision not totally on point, a California court
of appeal ruled that an employer could inspect the hard drive of a
work-at-home computer it had provided to an employee.63 The claims
arose from an allegedly wrongful termination based on the
Discovery, at http://www.fenwick.com/pub/litpubs/electronic/ED ExhA.pdf. (last visited Dec.
5, 2002) (for a copy of the pertinent Northwest Airlines order containing the protocol, courtesy
of Scott G. Knudson of Briggs and Moran).
Note, though, that at least one commentator has questioned the neutrality of the
Northwest Airlines expert. Sandra Rosenzweig, Rosie's Ramblings, CAL. LAW. (Dec. 2002)
("As Kenneth Shear, vice president of technology and law at Electronic Evidence Discovery...
, tells it... Northwest and counsel for the union agreed on a court-approved discovery protocol
that authorized... Northwest [to] cho[o]se its own accounting firm, Ernst & Young[,] ... to
copy the flight attendants' hard disks.").
58. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000), supp'd
by, 2000 U.S. Dist. 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Local 2000, Civ.
Action No. 00-08 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2000), at
http://www.fenwick.com/pub/litpubs/electronic/EDExhA.pdf.
59. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd in part
and rev 'din part on other grounds, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
60. See Munshani v. Signal Lake Venture Fund II, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 496, *3-4
(Oct. 9, 2001), where plaintiff submitted a copy of an e-mail as part of an opposition to a motion
to dismiss on statute of frauds grounds. Defendant challenged the e-mail's authenticity, and
plaintiff proposed that the court "appoint its own neutral expert to collect all relevant evidence
and ascertain the truth. Id. at *4. The court's expert determined, "in a 147-page detailed
report," that the e-mail was "clearly not authentic." Id. at *5.
61. Id. at *5.
62. Id. at *7.
63. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (Zieminski), 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 445,
452-53 (2002).
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employee's alleged intentional and repeated accessing of sexually
explicit websites. The employee had consented in writing to the
employer's policy of monitoring electronic communications
conducted on office personal computers (PC's) as well as work-at-
home PC's. Finding that, under California Constitution article 1
section 1, "the employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy
when he used the home computer for personal matters, the appellate
court directed the trial court to order the requested discovery." 64
b. Sanctions for Heinous Deletions
Courts have looked with particular disfavor at parties whose
spoliation consists of a deletion of files in defiance of a discovery
order. In a trade secret misappropriation case, the court imposed
sanctions on a former employee for such a transgression. The former
employee had retained copies of a sensitive database and confidential
e-mails containing customer information, and had taken them with
him to his new job. 65 During discovery the court ordered him to turn
over a copy of the database to his former employer, Lexis-Nexis, and
not to retain any copies. Yet, he attempted to reconstruct the database
on his new work laptop.66 When the laptop was finally produced for
inspection, Lexis-Nexis's forensic expert determined that the
employee had deleted a number of important Lexis-Nexis documents
that he had not earlier acknowledged possessing. The expert also
found hundreds of additional Lexis-Nexis e-mails with sensitive
company documents as attachments. The employee had not earlier
acknowledged possessing those e-mails. Lexis-Nexis sought
sanctions for spoliation. The court granted monetary sanctions against
64. Id. Though a potential federal e-mail monitoring claim by an employee is beyond the
scope of this Essay, note that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") allows "a
provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic
communication was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider ... from fraudulent,
unlawful or abusive use of such service." 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(h)(ii) (2002).
65. Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Minn. 1999). As he was leaving his
employment with LexisNexis, the employee copied onto a Zip disk sensitive company e-mails
as well as a database containing customer information. He then took that information with him
to his new job at Dow Jones Interactive Publishing, a direct LexisNexis competitor. The
employee transferred the e-mails and database to a new laptop he received from Dow Jones and
then threw the Zip disk away.
66. Upon learning of the steps he had taken, plaintiffs counsel requested that defendant's
counsel take immediate possession of the laptop. Defendant's counsel did so, and then
attempted to make a copy of the hard drive. During this attempt, counsel inadvertently
overwrote the remnants of some previously deleted data. To avoid a similar fate, informed
counsel should consider copying any disk that is thought to possibly contain relevant deleted
files. Any effort to restore deleted information should use a duplicate of the disk to avoid
complications that can result from botched restoration or retrieval activity.
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the employee for his discovery abuses and his clear violation of both
parts of the discovery order.67
Even in the absence of a preservation order, a court may impose
sanctions for deceitful conduct intended to destroy evidence relevant
to a pending motion. In late 2001, the Northern District of California
sanctioned a defendant for its egregious removal of website
68information in an attempt to avoid California personal jurisdiction.
In opposing a jurisdictional motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant company had maintained a California office. The
plaintiff submitted a printout of a page from the defendant's website
that had displayed that office's contact information. The web page
subsequently "disappeared" shortly after the filing of the motion. The
defendant initially denied that the web page "ever existed on its web
site or on any location authorized by Defendant." 69 Then, "[i]n a
sudden resurgence of memory," the defendant recalled deleting the
page "as part of 'routine maintenance,' but provided no details
whatsoever about this alleged practice. 70 When faced with this
obvious duplicity, the court sanctioned the defendant under Federal
Rule 37(b)(2) as well as under its inherent judicial powers; the award
included a monetary penalty, reasonable attorney fees, and costs. 7,
Because the defendant eventually stipulated to jurisdiction, an order
establishing personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2), while
justified, was not necessary. 72
67. Lexis-Nexis, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 955. The court, however, declined to draw any adverse
evidentiary inferences. Id. at 954-55. The court was not convinced that LexisNexis could show
that evidence pertinent to the litigation was actually destroyed. Id. at 954. In particular, it relied
on the experts' reports indicating that ostensibly deleted documents were actually still present on
the new laptop's hard drive. Id. Additionally, even if information had been deleted-for
example, when defendant's counsel overwrote inactive data while attempting to make a copy of
the laptop hard drive-the court found that Lexis-Nexis had failed to demonstrate that the loss
of this evidence would prejudice its case. Id. at 955 (relying on Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 104 (D. Colo. 1996).
68. Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Systems, Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18432,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. at *6.
71. Id. at * 14.
72. Id.
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2. Deleted Back-up Tapes
a. Background on Back-up Tapes
It is commonplace for companies to make daily or weekly
computer system data back-ups, to have on hand in case of a
catastrophic system crash. Typically, those back-up tapes are retained
for a week, a month, or a similar period of time, and then are put back
into rotation and recycled.73 Each back-up takes a snapshot of the
information on the computer system at the time of the back-up. When
subsequent back-up tapes are made a day, a week, or a month later,
previously created back-up tapes may be recycled or deleted from the
back-up storage facility. Information on back-up tapes, once they are
"restored," can be searched, extracted, or manipulated.
Although the cost of back-up tapes themselves is relatively
small, the cost of restoring, reviewing, and extracting responsive
information from back-up tapes can run into tens of thousands of
dollars. 74 Successive daily or weekly back-up tapes share much of the
same data, the only difference being modifications or deletions.
Thus, responding to a "blanket preservation order" by maintaining
back-up tapes throughout the life of a lawsuit "would probably result
in the accumulation of excessively duplicative and irrelevant data.,
75
A party has an obligation to preserve, search, and produce
responsive information contained on computer media and in its
computer system. Just how far must a party go to comply with this
obligation? Must it cease the recycling of back-up tapes and set them
aside indefinitely for possible use in the lawsuit? A back-up is by
definition a copy of data already on the computer system. Thus,
theoretically, at any given point in time, a party may fulfill its
discovery obligations by taking steps to preserve all pertinent data on
its system and searching for and collecting all potentially responsive
information residing in that system at the given juncture. As long as
the scope of discoverable information is delimited by a specific end
73. See, e.g., Linnen v. A. H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 189, 1999 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 240 (June 16, 1999) (back-up tapes recycled every three months).
74. Corinne L. Giacobbe, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding
Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 257, 262 (2000) (hereinafter Giacobbe) (discovery of electronically-stored data can be
extremely costly relative to hard copies, because companies tend to retain greater quantities of it
and because it tends to linger in storage systems longer); Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc., A
Balancing Act: Determining the Proper Level of Electronic Data Preservation, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS (June 1998), ), available at
http://www.eedinc.com/staticcontent/resourceLibrary/RD%20June%2098.pdf.
75. Id. at 262.
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date, coinciding with the date on which the preservation effort is
made, then additional back-up tapes from later dates would not be
important.76 The ultimate answer, though, will depend upon a variety
of factors, including:
* the judge;
* the underlying facts;
* the desires of the parties (e.g., has one party specifically
requested back-up tapes?);
* the sufficiency of the responding party's efforts to search
and preserve data on its computer system; and
* the scope of discoverable information-i.e., whether
discoverable information is regularly being produced in the
party's day-to-day business or whether the pertinent time
period is relatively fixed in the past.
b. Failure to Cease Ordinary Recycling
Some courts have enforced preservation obligations regarding
back-up tapes. For example, in one case, Linnen v. A. H. Robins
Company,77 the plaintiff succeeded on a sanctions motion, based on a
theory that the defendant's failure to preserve back-up tapes during
the first four months of the lawsuit was tantamount to evidence
destruction.78  The plaintiff argued that pertinent e-mails and other
information might have been deleted and therefore would only be
available on back-up tapes. According to the plaintiff, the challenged
four-month period was critical to the underlying product liability
claim, in that it had immediately preceded the defendant's decision to
remove from the market the relevant pharmaceutical product.
76. As a practical matter, this theoretical scenario will rarely, if ever, play out in this way
because it would require the preserver to be sufficiently clairvoyant to identify an exact and
accurate end date.
77. Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS at 240 (June 16, 1999).
78. Id. at *9 (upon receiving a preservation order or request for production encompasses
computer media, defendant must cease the recycling of back-up tapes and preserve those tapes
for production). Linnen was a wrongful death action involving the weight-loss drug
combination known as "fen/phen." The day the complaint was filed, plaintiff obtained an ex
parte preservation order. The court vacated the order a couple weeks later, but there
theoretically remained "an understanding between the parties that the [items] would not be
destroyed." Still another two weeks later, plaintiff served document requests on one of the
defendants, a pharmaceutical company. Those requests broadly defined "documents" to include
information stored in any computer medium. Yet defendant continued to recycle its system
back-up tapes under a three-month rotation schedule. It was not until three months after service
of the discovery requests that defendant ceased recycling the tapes and began setting them aside.
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In light of an ex parte preservation order (albeit temporary) and
the service of production requests, the defendant was obliged to
preserve the back-up tapes.79 Because the defendant did not fulfill
that obligation, the court granted spoliation sanctions, including a jury
instruction permitting the inference that the defendant had destroyed
potentially relevant evidence out of a realization that the evidence was
unfavorable.
80
Similarly, another court imposed spoliation sanctions for a
party's failure to preserve back-up tapes that were the only source of
relevant information.8' The defendant had not willfully destroyed
salient telephone routing plans to prevent discovery of them. Rather,
its computer system back-up files had been automatically deleted on a
weekly basis, as part of normal operating procedures.8 2 Once served
with a document request, the defendant should have been aware that
the routing plans were the subject of discovery. Thus, it was "at fault
for not taking steps to prevent.., routine deletion of... backup
files."8 3 The court rejected's putative excuse that the plaintiff had
been previously informed of the routine deletion of back-up files but
had not asked the defendant to save them.8 4 The defendant had an
independent, "affirmative" preservation duty."
85
c. Restoring & Searching Back-up Tapes
While potentially costly, assuming an obligation to restore many
back-up tapes in response to a discovery request "is one of the risks
79. In particular, the court ruled that:
During the period of time when the exparte order requiring defendant to preserve
all documents relating to this action was in effect, the customary recycling of
back-up tapes for the electronic mail system should have been suspended....
The recycling, and resultant destruction, of those back-up tapes was in clear
violation of the court's order.... [T]he request for production of documents
defined the term "document" in a broad fashion, seeking "any record or
compilation of information of any kind or description, however made .... or
stored." Also requested were any documents in the form of computer memory or
computer disk.... The language of the document request ma[de] it clear that
plaintiffs sought the production of items such as the system back-up tapes and,
after receiving this request, defendant had an obligation to preserve any such
documents or materials.
Id. at *29-30 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at *37.
81. Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Communications, Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14053, *10-11, * 14 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 17, 1996) (granting plaintiffs motion for adverse inference
of spoliation and for spoliation sanctions; also awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs).
82. Id. at *11.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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taken on by companies which have made the decision to avail
themselves of the computer technology now available to the business
world., 86  Courts are now unlikely to be swayed by a high tech
company that balks at the prospect of back-up restoration. For
example, in Linnen,87 the court did not look kindly on the lead
defendant's stonewalling. Robins had produced only a small number
of e-mail messages, in hard-copy form, as of one year into the
litigation. Plaintiff then requested the production of all e-mails, to or
from 15 people, referencing three significant topics. After months of
obfuscation and sporadic production, the defendant finally disclosed
that it might have located thousands of old back-up tapes. It had
apparently taken those tapes out of the recycling process in
connection with another case, Case No. MDL 1203, which was a
consolidated multi-district litigation action in which A. H. Robins Co.
was also a party.
The plaintiffs narrowed the categories of responsive tapes by
limiting the request to a shorter time frame, to a smaller number of
persons, and to a narrower issue. However, the plaintiffs also
broadened the request by seeking the restoration of all relevant back-
up tapes, not just a sampling. The court agreed that the tapes "ha[d]
the potential for containing relevant material and that the plaintiffs
should have the opportunity to examine at least a portion.., to
determine if that is the case.,
88
The defendant argued that restoring and searching back-up tapes
would be an unduly burdensome "multi-million dollar fishing
expedition." 89 The court disagreed, noting that the plaintiffs had
tailored the request to seek specific responsive e-mails. 90 The court
86. Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *18 ("[t]o permit a corporation such as
[defendant A.H. Robins, a large pharmaceutical company,] to reap the business benefits of such
technology and simultaneously use that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to
incongruous and unfair results."). Cf In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (if a party chooses an electronic storage
method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk).
87. Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super LEXIS 240, at * 16.
88. Id. at *"16.
89. Id. at *17.
90. The court rejected defendant's argument that the number of previously produced
documents (including e-mails) somehow affected plaintiff's right to additional discovery. Id. at
*17 n.6. See also Cobell v. Norton, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5291, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Mar. 29,
2002) (in light of court's prior rejection of same arguments, sanctioning defendant Department
of Interior for seeking a " 'protective order clarifying that it may produce e-mail in response to
discovery requests by producing from [sic] paper records of e-mail messages rather than from
backup tapes and may overwrite backup tapes in accordance with Departmental directives.' ").
Cf Cobell v. Norton, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5292 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2002). The Government's
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declined to order the restoration and search of all the requested back-
up tapes. It held that the parties should await the MDL 1203
restoration and sampling search results, which the defendant would
produce to the plaintiffs. Then, the plaintiffs could revisit their
request for production.
9 1
In a more recent decision, McPeek v. Ashcroft, 92 the District of
Columbia federal district court noted that "[t]here is certainly no
controlling authority for the proposition that restoring all backup
tapes is necessary in every case." Mindful of the costs involved and
the lack of precedent, the court "decided to take small steps and
perform, as it were, a test run" to determine if the costs associated
with a backup search were justified by relevant results. 93
In McPeek, Plaintiff had sought to force the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to search for backup copies of deleted files that might
relate to retaliation which the plaintiff claimed to have suffered
many discovery abuses in Cobell ultimately contributed to the court's issuance of multiple civil
contempt orders. See Cobell v. Norton, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17353 (D.D.C. Sep. 17, 2002)
(267 page opinion finding Interior Department's Secretary as well as its Assistant Secretary of
Interior for Indian Affairs in civil contempt for failing to comply with prior order to initiate
historical accounting project on Individual Indian Money trust funds).
91. In one of the fen-phen litigations, a plaintiff's computer forensics experts uncovered a
"smoking gun" e-mail message, which was ultimately leaked to the press. Depending on which
article one reads, the message is attributed to a different individual-e.g., an accountant at A.H.
Robins' successor American Home Products (AHP) or an administrator at AHP's subsidiary
Wyeth-Aherst Laboratories. The message is universally claimed to have read: "Do I have to
look forward to my waning years writing checks to fat people with a silly lung problem?"
Michael Bartlett, Companies Must Prepare for Ediscovery, NEWSBYTES, May 23, 2002; J.
Robert Keena, E-Discovery: Unearthing Documents Byte by Byte, BENCH & BAR OF MINN.,
Mar. 2, 2002, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2002/mar02/ediscovery.htm.
The take-away, according to Keena:
Once discovery begins, the chase is on for smoking gun e-mails, memos
admitting liability, deleted design documents, and other documents never
intended to see the light of day. Simply adding a request for e-mails and
electronic documents to a standard discovery request will not likely inspire an
opponent to conduct such a forensic search. Specific requests, clearly aimed at
electronic evidence, are needed instead. It has been proven time and time again
that e-mails are fertile ground for unearthing damaging documents. Individuals
believe them to be private communication.
Cf Ann Cams, Those Bawdy E-Mails Were Good For a Laugh-Until the Ax Fell,
WALL ST. J., February 4, 2000, available at
http://www.db.com/wows/career/publish/949697796.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2002):
[I]n harassment suits[, ] one or two explicit e-mail messages typically aren't
enough by themselves to prove that a workplace environment was hostile. But
such e-mail can bolster other damaging evidence. At a subsidiary of Chevron
Corp., e-mail containing such jokes as '25 reasons beer is better than women'
were used along with other evidence in a sexual-harassment claim that was
settled in 1995 for $2.2 million.
92. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
93. Id.
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because he complained about sexual harassment. The court
recognized the high cost that the DOJ would incur to produce
backups.94 Part of the cost at hand stemmed from the nature of the
DOJ computer system, designed "not for the purpose of creating a
[copy] of each user's hard drive [but] ... to prevent disaster." 95 As a
result, the court only ordered the DOJ to perform a backup restoration
of the e-mails to and from the plaintiffs supervisor for a one-year
period.96
Even more recently, a Second Circuit jury verdict reversal
reinforced the judicial trend of scrutinizing companies' contentions
that they cannot recover data stored on back-up tapes. In Residential
Funding Corporation v. DeGeorge Financial Corporation,97 the
appellate court found that the trial court had not adequately dissected
the plaintiffs months of protestations concerning purported technical
difficulties in recovering e-mails from the critical time period at issue.
Those contentions, which had continued past the start of trial, were
rendered quite suspicious by the defendant's consultant's ability, to
recover 950,000 e-mails from the pertinent time period in four days.98
C. Inspection of Opponent's Computer System
A party might request to inspect its opponent's computer system
to search for electronic information. Sometimes parties agree that a
computer system will be made available for expert inspection and/or
copying.99 If, however, the parties do not agree that computers or a
computer system should be produced for inspection or copying, the
requesting party must be able to explain the need for that discovery.
Courts typically require evidence that the search will locate
94. Id. at 32 ("merely restoring the e-mail from a single backup tape would take eight
hours at a cost of no less than $93 per hour").
95. Id. at 33.
96. Id. at 34-35. (choosing that timeframe "because a letter from plaintiff's counsel to
DOJ, complaining of retaliation and threatening to file an administrative claim," was dated one
day before the start of the year to be restored; and the court was "hoping that the restoration
w[ould] yield both the e-mails [plaintiff's supervisor] sent and those he received").
97. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin., Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20422, at
"13 (2d Cir. 2002).
98. Id. at *34-37.
99. See, e.g., R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd.,89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353, 356 (1999)
(imposing terminating sanctions based on Plaintiff's deletion of files, in violation of stipulation
that "computers and diskettes would not be operated or touched.., until defendants' computer
expert could examine them").
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responsive information, any inconvenience will be justified, and the
chances for harm will be minimized.' 00
This requirement was illustrated in Fennell v. First Step Designs,
Ltd.,10 1 a discrimination case, in which a discharged employee sought
creation-date evidence for a memorandum regarding some layoffs,
including her own. The defendant produced a copy of the memo on
computer disk. When the plaintiff could not determine the creation
date, she sought access to the defendant's computer hard drive. The
parties' competing computer experts disagreed as to whether dates of
creation and last modification could be determined from the hard
drive. The district court held a hearing and "directed the parties to
submit a 'protocol' establishing procedures by which [the plaintiff]
would have access to relevant materials."' 0 2 The defendant objected
to the plaintiffs proposed protocol, which entailed a technician
copying the entire hard drive, analyzing the copy off site, and later
erasing the copy. 10 3  The defendant submitted its own detailed
protocol, which the court described as "extremely cumbersome and
expensive."104
After reviewing the competing protocols and "apparently
recognizing that the parties were unlikely to reach consensus," the
district court reversed its earlier decision to permit additional
discovery. ° 5 It concluded that the hard drive copying presented a low
likelihood of success, along with substantial risks and costs. 10 6 The
First Circuit affirmed, noting that the lack of detail in the plaintiffs
protocol "cast even more doubt on the soundness of the technical
basis for the discovery venture."'
'0 7
100. See, e.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526 (1st Cir. 1996); Simon Prop.
Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000), supp'd by, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Local 2000 Int'l Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Civ. Action No. 00-08 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2000), at
http://www.fenwick.com/pub/litpubs/electronic/EDExhA.pdf; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles,
60 F.Supp.2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 279 F.3d
796 (9th Cir. 2002).
101. Fennel, 83 F.3d at 526.
102. Fennell, 83 F.3d at 530-32 (instructing that the procedure should minimize the
intrusion into, and interference with, defendant's operations and should assure confidentiality).
103. Id. at 532. Defendant claimed plaintiff's protocol: failed to describe the methodology
by which the technician would determine the creation and modification dates; presented risks
from accidental data loss, incompatible hardware and system downtime; did not adequately
address attorney-client privilege and work product concerns as to documents on the hard drive;
and allowed unsupervised possession of the copy.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 533.
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Similarly, a state court of appeal reversed an order that had given
the plaintiff unlimited access to the defendant's computer system in
Strasser v. Yalamanchi.10 8 In Strasser, The plaintiff/doctor sought to
inspect the computer system of the defendant, his ex-colleague. The
plaintiff desired to locate and recover previously purged financial
data. The defendant objected, claiming that the search would "allow
carte blanche access, unlimited in scope, nature or purpose."'
0 9
Ultimately, the trial court ordered the requested discovery. On
appeal, though, the court agreed with the defendant that unfettered
access was inapt, especially given the lack of any solid evidence of
data recoverability."10  Moreover, even if there had been
recoverability evidence, a tailored search would have been justified
only if no other less intrusive means existed." '1
In each of the three relatively recent decisions mentioned in
section II(B)(1)(b) above, a court has appointed a neutral computer
expert to copy the defendant's to-be-searched computer hard drive to
try to recover deleted files. 1 2 Each court required that the requesting
party, the plaintiff, would pay the expert's resultant fees and costs. 1 13
Additionally, in each case, to address concerns about possible
attorney-client privilege waiver, each expert had to agree to the terms
of the respective protective order, and the data recovered by the
expert was turned over to defense counsel for pre-production review
for privilege and responsiveness. 1
4
108. Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 669 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev. den., 805
So.2d 810 (Fla. 2001).
109. Id. at 1144. Defendant also claimed it would: constitute a wholesale intrusion into all
proprietary business files and statutorily-protected patient information; and expose the system to
harm through inadvertent deletion of files or the introduction of a virus.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1145. in that event, the trial court would have to "define parameters of time and
scope, and.., place sufficient access restrictions to prevent compromising patient
confidentiality and to prevent harm to defendant's computer and databases."
112. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
supp'd by, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Local 2000 Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Civ. Action No. 00-08 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2000), at
http://www.fenwick.com/pub/litpubs/electronic/EDExhA.pdf; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles,
60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
113. Simon, 194 F.R.D. at 641; Fenwick & West, Order on Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order & Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery, Protocol, at 3, para. 5 (D. Minn.
Feb. 2, 2000); at http://www.fenwick.com/pub/litpubs/electronic/EDExhA.pdf. (last visited
Dec. 5, 2002); Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55 n.6.
114. Simon, 194 F.R.D. at 641; Northwest, Protocol at 3, para. 9; Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d
at 1055. A recent example of a protective order encompassing privilege issues accompanies the
decision in United States v. Sungard Data Systems, 173 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24-30 (D.D.C. 2001)
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D. The Logistics of Producing Electronic Information
1. Production of Compilations of Electronic Information
Although the duty to preserve and produce back-up tapes and
deleted files is a relatively novel issue, the general obligation to
produce electronic information is well-established. The production of
information in hard-copy form does not preclude the requesting party
from receiving that same information in computerized form." 5 A
court may also require a party to compile electronic data into a
particular format or structure requested by the opposing party. 1 6 If a
request is burdensome, a court may require the requesting party to not
only show the need for the information but also agree to pay the costs
of production.l17 If the respective merits of the justification-versus-
burden analysis are uncertain, the court may order the parties to the
negotiating table.
118
2. Compelling Creation of Electronic Information
In a very recent copyright infringement suit, the Central District
of California ruled that a technology provider cannot be required to
collect and produce data regarding its customers' use of its product." 1
9
The suit was brought by television executives and movie studios
(extending confidential information access to two in-house attorneys for each Defendant,
contingent on their compliance with protective order).
115. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
3, 1995).
116. Anti-Monopoly, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at *1 ("the producing party can be
required to design a computer program to extract [aggregate reports] from its computerized
business records, subject to the Court's discretion as to the allocation of [design] costs."). See
also Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (requiring plaintiff in antitrust case to rerun program causing its computer to assemble
and print sales data onto computer-readable media such as magnetic tape; defendants
volunteered to pay cost). But see Replay decision discussed in section II(D)(2).
117. Anti-Monopoly, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at *3.
118. See id. Plaintiff sought production in electronic form of every invoice and credit
memo generated by defendant over a four year period. Determining that it had insufficient
information to weigh the purported justification against the alleged burden, the court asked the
parties to negotiate. Id.
119. Paramount Corp., et al. v. Replay TV, Inc. and SONICblue, Inc., No. CV 01-9358-
FMC (Ex) (C.D. Cal.), at
http://www.eff.org/IP/video/Paramount v ReplayTV/20011031_complaint.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2001). See Order, at http://www.fenwick.com/About Fenwick-
PrivacyDocuments/ReplayReview Decision CDCal_5-30-02.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
For many pleadings and decisions in Replay TV, see the Replay TV segment of the Privacy Law
Resources page maintained by the authors' firm, Fenwick & West LLP ("F&W"), at
http://www.fenwick.com/AboutFenwick/PrivacyLawResources.htm#Anonymity (last
modified Sept. 20, 2002).
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regarding the Replay TV 400, a personal video recorder (PVR) that
enables users to, among other things, store television programs for
later viewing and skip commercials.
The plaintiffs had sought discovery of documents and
information regarding the defendants' customers, including
identification of the television shows that the customers had recorded.
In support of their request, The plaintiffs contended that "there [wa]s
nothing unusual about directing a party to create software to 'retrieve
information stored in computers."",120  They argued that there is "a
duty to extract relevant information to respond to an interrogatory."'12'
Initially, the magistrate judge ordered the requested discovery. 22
The defendants obtained a stay of the magistrate's order upon filing a
motion for district judge review of the order compelling discovery. 23
In their motion for review, the defendants emphasized that the
requested items were never in their possession because they have
opted not to monitor customer usage. 124  They contended that
reinstatement of the discovery order would improperly force them to,
... design and develop new software to operate the ReplayTV
4000. Plaintiffs have insisted that Defendants install that
reformulated product into units within consumers' homes to
silently monitor private television viewing behavior and generate
new electronic data about such uses. The product would then have
to transmit that new electronic data from the consumers' home
120. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 362 (1978). See also
Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, available at
http://www.fenwick.com/About-Fenwick/PrivacyDocuments/ReplayCompelBrief CDCa-4
-I 1-02.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
121. Id. In support of this proposition, Plaintiffs cited Jones v. Syntex Labs., Inc., No.
99C3113, 2001 WL 1338987, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ('duty to fully answer [interrogatory]
implies a duty to make reasonable efforts to obtain information within the knowledge and
possession of others.'); PHE, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 139 F.R.D. 249, 257 (D.D.C. 1991)
(requiring party responding to interrogatories to retrieve computerized information about their
distribution operations '[a]lthough no program may presently exist to obtain the information
requested'); and Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corporation, 113 F.R.D. 502, 507 (N.D.
I11. 1986) (ordering responding party to provide information and documents necessary to enable
plaintiff to develop "sufficient statistical base" as evidence of claim).
122. Minute Order ("Order"), at 1, available at
http://www.fenwick.com/AboutFenwick/Privacy_Documents/ReplayOrderCDCal_4-26-
02.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
123. Defendants' papers in support of their Ex Parte Application for Stay and their Motion
for Review, at http://www.fenwick.com/AboutFenwick/PrivacyLaw Resources.htm#Replay
(last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
124. Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Review ("Review Brief') at 25, at
http://www.fenwick.com/AboutFenwick/PrivacyDocuments/Replay-Review-Brief CDCa-5
-10-02.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
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units to Defendants' servers, to be stored indefinitely, and made
available to Plaintiffs in th[e] litigation.'
25
The defendants contended that the magistrate's order would
"not merely direct [them] to write ancillary software to extract or
process in a new way the data it already possesses" but also to create
software that would not process any information already contained in
[their] servers."' 126 The defendants asked the court to distinguish prior
compilation production cases 127 as having entailed either retrieval or
software design to enable the extraction of already extant electronic
business records.128 They posited that, in contrast, a party cannot be
"required 'to prepare, or cause to be prepared,' new documents solely
for their production."1
29
The Replay TV defendants also argued that "[w]hile Rule 34
may require compilations from existing databases, no authority
supports the proposition that Rule 34 can require creation of new data
that never existed-much less the reformulation of a consumer
product to create such data."' 130 The district court judge accepted the
defendants' interpretation of Rule 34, ruling that "the information
sought by plaintiffs is not now and has never been in existence. The
[portion of the Magistrate's] Order requiring its production is
therefore contrary to law."' 3' That determination may have a great
impact on future discovery disputes in which one party seeks to
compel another to compile, manipulate and/or generate data.
3. Facilitating Opponent's Access of Electronic Information
A court may require the producing party to make it easier for the
requesting party to access electronic information as an alternative to
ordering massive hard-copy production. For example, in an
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id.
127. PHE, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 139 F.R.D. 249, 257 (D.D.C. 1991); Anti-Monopoly,
Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2000).
128. Review Brief, supra note 124, at 7, n.7, arguing:
[A] party cannot be required to create, either in paper or electronic form,
documents or data that do not currently exist within its possession. Hill v.
McHenry, Civil Action No. 99-2026-CM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8033 (D. Kan.
April 30, 2002) (court "cannot compel the production of documents that do not
exist"). Rule 34 "only requires a party to produce documents that are already in
existence."
Alexander v. FBI, 194 F.R.D. 305, 310 (D.D.C. 2000).
129. Review Brief, supra not 124, at 8.
130. Id.
131. Order, supra note 122, at 5 (citing National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
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employment discrimination case, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision to deny the plaintiffs motion to compel production
of what would have amounted to 210,000 hard-copy pages of e-
mails.132 The defendant had initially produced the e-mails on four-
inch tapes, an inaccessible format for the plaintiff/employee's
counsel, who had neither the software nor the equipment to read
them. To accommodate the employee, the district court required the
employer to download the data from the tapes to conventional
computer disks or a computer hard drive, loan the employee a copy of
the necessary software, or offer him on-site access to its own
system. 133 Only if those options ultimately failed (and they did not in
this case) would the court have ordered the parties to split the cost of
copying the e-mails in hard-copy form. 1
34
In a very recent decision, practical considerations seemed to
hamstring a judge who might otherwise have required the defendant
to produce "data in electronic, manipulable form [to] facilitate expert
analysis."' 35 Goord is a class action brought by inmates to challenge
the "double-celling" practice of the New York State Department of
Corrective Services ("DOCS"). Nearly six years into the litigation,
the inmates sought production of electronic records and databases
maintained by state correctional authorities. Judge Lynch explained:
[T]he expert affidavits supplied by defendants, and uncontradicted
by any evidence offered by plaintiffs, persuasively establish
that... [b]ecause the databases were designed for the operational
purposes of prison administrators, the data desired by plaintiffs,
while perhaps present in the databases, are not readily available for
the statistical manipulations proposed by plaintiffs .... Thus, the
databases in question are not simply collections of lists or numbers
that can be easily extracted and correlated with other numbers;
rather, each of the requested databases has 'been constructed to
support the interactions of hundreds of concurrent users rather than
to support the analytical activities of a few.'
Thus, providing plaintiffs with any meaningful access to aspects of
this system is not a matter of duplicating discs and handing over
copies. The data that would presumably be useful to plaintiffs in
132. Sattarv. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1998).
133. Id. at 1171. Cf GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3804
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (ordering defendant to make available person most familiar with its
computer records to provide reasonable assistance while plaintiffs' data retrieval expert would
be given computer access).
134. Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1171.
135. Jones v. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002).
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analyzing patterns of disease and violence or correlating such
pattems with double-celled inmates are not simply numbers
maintained in a simple set of files that can be downloaded into
some (unspecified) statistical analytic program and then crunched
in some (unspecified) way to produce meaningful results. DOCS
personnel would need to prepare extensive documentation of the
structure of the programs and databases to enable any experts
retained by plaintiffs to understand the layout of the data, the
meaning of codes, and the sources from which those codes can be
derived. 1
36
Four practical considerations doomed the plaintiffs "plausible
claim" that "manipulable data" was needed. 37 First, even though he
acknowledged the financial constraints of pro bono counsel, the judge
was troubled by the plaintiffs' lack of an expert, as this deficiency
rendered the plaintiffs' discovery plan quite general.'38 Second, much
of what the inmates hoped to discover was contained in more than
700,000 pages of hard-copy records already produced in paper form,
at considerable state expense. 139 Third, the factual context entailed
the same type of "significant security[/confidentiality] concerns"
typically found in trade secrets cases "in a business context."'
' 40
Lastly, the plaintiffs' request had been made very late in a case
that had been pending for more than six years and after numerous
extensions of the discovery cutoff date. 141 Therefore, the court
declined to "impose additional burden, expense and risk of harm on
the parties, and especially on the defendants, at this belated hour, after
the expenditure of so much effort and expense, and on the
undocumented hope of obtaining such speculative benefits."'
142
In contrast, in another civil case against the government, a state's
highest court went quite far in finding the discoverability of electronic
136. Id. at *28-29, *31.
137. Id. at *39. One has to wonder about the candor of Defendants' evidence, given that
one of their defenses was that the information had already been produced in printouts. If the
extraction process were indeed so complicated, then how did Defendants extract the information
to produce the printed reports?
138. Id. Mere speculation of another sort doomed another Plaintiff's recent electronic
discovery request in Stallings-Daniel v. Northern Trust Co, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4024, at * 1-
2 (N.D. 11. Mar. 12, 2002). The court denied the employee-plaintiff's request to use an expert
to search company-defendant's e-mail system to determine whether e-mails produced to her in
hard-copy had been altered. The court found that plaintiff's request "was supported by nothing
more than speculation that defendant had somehow altered its e-mails before producing them."
l39. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, at *42.
140. Id. at *37.
141. Id. at *46-47.
142. id. at *48.
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reports and databases. 143 The discovery dispute in Guillen v. Pierce
County arose when, to develop a wrongful death claim, a widower
filed a separate lawsuit seeking disclosure of historical traffic accident
reports. Even though relevant federal and state statutes precluded the
reports from being publicly disclosed or from ultimately being
admitted into evidence, the Washington high court ruled that the
reports could be discoverable in the widower's case and in a similar
consolidated case.' 44 Of potential significance for future electronic
discovery disputes was the court's observation that:
As governments everywhere move from paper and microfiche
documentation into the age of twenty-first century information
technology, public records are increasingly being stored-even
created-in digital format, then added to virtual databases that are
accessed, in streams of bits and bytes, by vast networks of
governmental agencies, often across jurisdictional boundaries. 145
4. Allocating Compilation and Production Costs
The fact that production of electronic information will result in
substantial expense does not necessarily mean that the requesting
party will be required to pay the costs of production. 146 Who pays for
the costs of searching, extracting, and producing electronic data
depends upon the parties' relative circumstances and how much, if at
all, the production would also benefit the responding party. 147  In
balancing such factors in various factual contexts, federal district
court cases have reached disparate outcomes.
Some decisions have shifted to the requesting party the costs of
compiling and producing electronic information. 148  In the Linnen
143. Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628 (2001), cert. granted, 152 L. Ed. 2d 648 (Apr.
4, 2002).
144. Id. at 632-33.
145. Id. at 646. See generally William A. Fenwick & Robert D. Brownstone, Electronic
Filing: What Is It? What are its Implications?, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J.
181 (2002) (discussing of the impacts of efiling and egovemment).
146. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Lit. ("Ciba"), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8281 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (class action defendants included the Ciba-Geigy Corporation).
147. Anti-Monopoly, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at *2 (potential factors include
whether: " amount of money is ... inordinate and excessive[,]... relative expense and burden
in obtaining the data would be greater to the requesting party as compared to the responding
party, and.., responding party will benefit to some degree in producing the data in question").
See also Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Co., 205 F.R.D. 421, 2002-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P73, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying eight-factor balancing approach; granting defendants'
motion for protective order to extent Plaintiffs would bear costs of production-though
defendants would continue to bear expense of reviews for privileged or confidential material).
148. See Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000),
supp'd by, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
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fen/phen class action, the court ordered the responding party to bear
the expenses of back-up tape restoration. 149 Yet, the judge reserved a
ruling on fees and costs associated with additional pertinent
depositions sought by the requesting party until after the parties had
an opportunity to evaluate information generated from the back-up
tapes. 150
Other decisions have declined to remove the cost burden from
the shoulders of the responding party. 151 In one such instance, a court
mandated payment of all expenses unnecessarily incurred because of
the defendant's inaccurate disclosure of its computer capabilities. 152
In another case, a federal antitrust class action, the plaintiffs
sought to compel one of the defendants, Ciba-Geigy Corp. ("Ciba"),
to produce responsive, computer-stored e-mails at its own expense.
53
Ciba objected, arguing that the request was overly broad and
burdensome, and that the plaintiffs should bear the retrieval costs. 154
Ciba estimated that it had the equivalent of at least 30 million pages
of e-mail data stored on back-up tapes, and that it would cost from
$50,000 to $70,000 to search for responsive e-mails, eliminate
duplicates, and format the messages.
Local 2000 Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Civ. Action No. 00-08, Order, at 3 para. 5 (D. Minn.
Feb. 2, 2000), at http://www.fenwick.com/pub/lit_pubs/electronic/EDExhA.pdf; Playboy, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 n.6, aff'd in part & rev"d in part on other grounds, 279 F.3d 796 (9th
Cir. 2002).
149. Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *22-23 (imposing all fees and costs
associated with e-mail discovery issue, including depositions of IT representatives, in light of
defendant's lack of cooperation in responding to requests on e-mail issues; its denial of
existence of back-up tapes; and its delay in informing plaintiff of existence of archived back-up
tapes).
150. In dicta, the court stated that:
[I]t certainly would be fair to require [defendant] to bear the costs associated with
the retaking of any depositions previously conducted by the plaintiffs as well as
any appropriate new depositions. Where the necessity of engaging in further
depositions stems from the defendant's delay in producing documents requested,
at a minimum, over a year ago, then the defendant must shoulder the costs
attendant upon such a delay.
Id. at 20.
151. See, e.g., Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459 (D. Utah 1985) (declining to shift
from defendant/employer to plaintiffs/employees, given amount of expenses and relative
abilities to bear cost).
152. GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3804, *7-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2000), enforced, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16244 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2000) (ultimately
awarding requesting party $109,753.81 in expenses and attorney fees). In GTFM the court also
factored in defendant's poor track record on compliance with discovery requests in litigation
generally, not just in that particular case.
153. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281,
*2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
154. Id. at *1.
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The court declined to impose on the plaintiffs that cost because it
resulted from Ciba's record-keeping scheme and its choice of
electronic storage. 1 The court only required the plaintiffs to pay
$0.21 per page for the e-mails that they selected for copying; and it
also ordered them to narrow the scope of their electronic information
request.
56
III. PRACTICAL LITIGATION TIPS REGARDING ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY
A. Tips for Requesting Electronic Information from the Other
Side
1. Overview/Strategy
The amount of time and attention you devote to seeking
discovery of electronic data should depend upon the size of the case,
the matters at issue, and the time and resources available for the case.
Early in the case (and if possible before the case is filed), you should
think about what types of electronic information are likely to exist
and are needed to prove the case. Before asking for the production of
electronic data, such as back-up tapes and deleted files, weigh the
costs against the potential benefits. Back-up tapes, for example, must
be restored and searched for responsive information; depending upon
the number of tapes, it can entail a costly and time-consuming
process. If the circumstance justifies requesting information in
electronic form, obtain expert assistance in framing and justifying the
request.
Keep in mind that the opponent will likely ask your client for
reciprocal information, if both parties rely on electronic record
keeping and processing systems. Even if not served initially, the
request could come later. If you plan to press an opponent to preserve
and produce a broad amount of electronic information, make sure
your client is doing the same and that the collection and preservation
efforts are thorough, adequate, and above reproach.
157
155. Id at *2.
156. Id. at *8.
157. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631-32 (D. Utah 1998)
(imposing sanctions on plaintiff for failure to preserve corporate e-mails of "five individuals that
[plaintiff] had itself identified as having relevant information" when, earlier in case, plaintiff had
insisted that opposing party preserve all its corporate e-mail communications until relevant
2002]
164 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
2. Preservation Requests and Orders
If electronic information is important, promptly notify the other
side of your intent to request it. Early in the case, you should
consider sending a letter to opposing counsel reminding him or her of
the obligation to preserve evidence, including electronic data, and
delineating the categories of electronic evidence your client will be
seeking (e.g., e-mails, databases, spreadsheets, back-up tapes and
transaction records). Elucidate your side's expectations and desires.
A powerful tool in the effort to obtain electronic information is a
preservation order. The duty to preserve evidence exists
independently of a court order.158 Yet, to highlight that obligation, to
set forth the ground rules, and to provide sharper teeth, you should
ask the court to enter a preservation order specifically identifying
electronic information. 59 The absence of a court order may narrow
the scope of the available sanctions should evidence destruction
ensue. 160
In one case the defendant moved for sanctions based on plaintiff
Procter & Gamble's (P&G) alleged destruction of e-mail
material could be extracted), aff'd & rev"d on other grounds, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000).
158. The duty to preserve is not necessarily contingent on an existing court order. See
West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[e]ven without a
discovery order, a district court may impose sanctions for spoliation, exercising its inherent
power to control litigation" (citing Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,43 (1991)).
159. See Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *23-24 (initial ex parte order
mandated "all necessary steps to assure that.., employees, agents, accountants and attorneys
refrain from discarding, destroying, erasing, purging or deleting any such documents
including.., computer memory, computer disks, data compilations, e-mail messages sent and
received and all back-up computer files or devices, including ... electronic, optical or magnetic
storage media"); Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (in employment
discrimination class action, temporary restraining order prohibited defendants from moving,
altering or deleting any potentially pertinent electronic records; court altered TRO to permit
modifications in ordinary course of business and deletion of documents if hardcopies retained),
rev'don other grounds, 263 F.3d 594 (5th Cir. 2001).
See also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 600 (D.N.J.
1997) (entering order at beginning of case that all parties "preserve all documents and other
records containing information potentially relevant to the subject matter of this litigation"); In re
Infant Formula Antitrust Litig., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202532, *2-3, (N.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 1991)
(stipulated order imposing preservation obligation regarding "any relevant document or other
relevant item, " defined broadly to encompass "all mechanical and electronic sound records or
transcripts thereof, any retrievable data whether carded, taped, coded, electrostatically,
electromagnetically or otherwise, and other data compilation from which information can be
obtained").
160. Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *30-31 (declining to award monetary
sanctions for defendant's spoliation, which ran afoul of informal understanding that had
replaced withdrawn order); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631-32
(D. Utah 1998), affd in part & rev"d in part on other grounds, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000).
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communications. In the absence of a preservation order, P&G had
responded to defendant's requests for production by searching its e-
mail databases for responsive evidence and then deleted non-
responsive data. The defendant challenged the adequacy of those
searches, claiming that responsive evidence had been deleted. The
court concluded that it could not fairly judge the adequacy of the
plaintiffs searches, with the exception of the deletions of the e-mail
of five individuals whom the plaintiff itself had identified as having
relevant information. 162 The court explained:
[W]hile the duty to preserve evidence exists independently of court
order, a court order would have delineated the scope of P&G's
duties, provided clear evidence that P&G was on notice of the
relevance of the e-mail communications, and furnished a standard
by which this court could judge the adequacy of P&G's production
efforts. 1
63
In another case, the court required "all parties to preserve the
integrity of all computers ... at issue ... without any spoilation [sic]
of any information contained therein."'' 64 Elaborating on that
mandate, the judge stated: "[I]f it's 'don't push the delete button' or if
it's 'don't change the C drive' or 'don't pull the plug at the wrong
time' or 'don't take a sledge hammer to it,' I don't want it spoiled in
any way, okay, so don't limit [the preservation order's language].' 65
Consider expedited or early depositions of the opposing party's
employees who are most knowledgeable about the opponent's
information technology uses and systems. Such early discovery
should eliminate some of the types of delay and vagueness arguments
successfully raised by the party opposing discovery in Goord.
166
3. Considerations Particular to Electronic Information
a. Specifically Request All Desired Types of Items
To request all needed forms of electronic information, make sure
your definition of documents particularizes various forms of
161. Procter & Gamble, 179 F.R.D. at 631-32.
162. Id.
163. Id. at631.
164. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Prods., Ltd., 43 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (E.D.
11. 1999).
165. Id.
166. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, at *28-29, *46-47.
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electronic media. 67 Also, do not merely rely upon a broad definition
of "documents." Such broad definitions are commonplace, and the
opposing party may overlook them. If, for example, you desire e-
mails, spreadsheets and databases relating to specified topics, then
specify those items in the requests themselves. 168 That way, there can
be no mistake as to what your client seeks. In addition, courts do not
look favorably on unduly broad and burdensome definitions. For
example, one court denied a motion to compel because "Plaintiffs are
not entitled to unbridled access to defendants' computer system or to
canvass all of the defendants' debtor files."'
169
Though one should be as proactive as possible from the get-go,
occasionally, in the interests of justice, a court will modify an overly
broad discovery request. In one recent case, DeLoach v. Philip
Morris Companies, 70  the defendants claimed that the discovery
request for "all summary documents" (including electronic data) was
overbroad.' 7' The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
constructed a rebuttal report based on a couple of million entries it
had deleted from a database and thus deliberately withheld. "The data
was not produced by [d]efendants until after [defendants'] rebuttal
report was submitted, after [p]laintiff s expert report had been
submitted and [p]laintiffs' expert had been deposed.' ' 172  The court
167. See, e.g., Linnen, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240, at *4 n.3 ("document" defined to
include "any record or compilation of information of any kind or description however made,
produced, or reproduced, or stored whether by hand or by any electronic, photographic,
magnetic, optical, mechanical, computer or other process or technology"); R.S. Creative, Inc. v.
Creative Cotton, Ltd., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (1999) ("definition of 'document' in deposition
notice included computer tapes, discs and any information stored in a computer").
168. At least until such time as judges are more comfortable with the concept of electronic
information, the prospect of defeating a motion for a protective order as well as the success of
any "meet and confer" conference will be dependent on the specificity of the request for
electronic information.
A large number of judges reject out-of-hand a request for "all" of anything. Rather
than attempting to encompass "electronic information" in the definition of "document," in some
situations requesting counsel may want to differentiate hardcopies of information from copies of
electronic information.
169. Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 189 F.R.D. 440, 441 (D. Ore.
1999). See also Sabouri v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 2000 WL 1620915, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 24, 2000) ("[a]lthough plaintiff is entitled to view files that relate to him or to the
claims or defenses asserted in this action, he has no right to rummage through the computer files
of the defendants").
170. Deloach v. Philip Morris Cos., 206 F.R.D 568 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
171. When defendant claimed plaintiff had a responsibility to contact opposing counsel to
discuss the missing data, the court noted that plaintiff did not know any data was missing until
defendants filed their expert rebuttal report. Philip Morris, 206 F.R.D at 573. "[T]he disputed
data was readily available from [defendants'] database, required no additional preparation, and
was obviously relevant enough that defendants saw fit to provide it to [its expert)." Id. at 574.
172. Id. at 573. Defendant then deleted more than two million entries (without informing
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found that the defendant "should have produced the disputed
database."17 3  After considering a range of responses (including
sanctions, which it declined to impose), the court decided to "allow
[p]laintiffs the opportunity to respond to [d]efendants' rebuttal expert
report [and to deny] [d]efendants... the opportunity to reply to
[p]laintiffs' response to the withheld information."' 174
In a dispute between competing software companies regarding
allegedly improper copying and use of proprietary source code, the
plaintiff sought production of the entire source code for each of the
defendant's products from the previous three and one-half years. 1
5
The plaintiff also requested copies of all hard drives that had access to
the server from which the information at issue was purportedly
copied.176 The court ruled that "[p]roduction of this magnitude would
be unduly burdensome to [defendant], both in terms of volume and in
terms of the proprietary nature of the information sought.'
77
b. "Meet and Confer" Negotiations
It is a good practice to discuss with the other side the logistics of
electronic discovery early in a litigation. Especially in an action in
which electronic information is likely to be significant, such a
discussion is likely necessary to assure compliance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(f). Rule 26(f) provides in pertinent part that
"the parties must, as soon as practicable and in any event at least 21
days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is
due under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 16(b), confer.., to develop a proposed
discovery plan." As one federal district court judge recently pointed
out:
In the electronic age, this [Rule 26(f)] meet and confer should
include a discussion o[f] whether each side possesses information
in electronic form, whether they intend to produce such material,
whether each other's software is compatible, whether there exists
any privilege issue requiring redaction, and how to allocate costs
involved with each of the foregoing.178
plaintiff of the deletion) and provided plaintiff with "the single item that was specifically and
unambiguously requested." Id.
173. Id. at 574.
174. Id.
175. Symantec Corp. v. McAfee Ass'n., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22591, *10 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 14, 1998).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 443-45 (D.N.J. 2002)
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As part and parcel of "meet and confer," you might try to
informally obtain information about your opponent's computer
system, including its functionality, breadth, scope, and number of
users. Consider methods to search for responsive information. Some
e-mail systems have search functions that could expedite the process;
also, there may be software to help search databases. It would be
useful to obtain a copy of the opponent's document retention or
records management policy and also a copy of its e-mail policy. In
addition, hard-copy documents may reveal information about the
opponent's computer system, including the use of third party
software, system flow charts, file naming conventions, e-mail
programs and the like.17 9
("denying defendants' [request] for ... full reimbursement for paper copying costs" where
defendants had "dumped" more than three million pages on plaintiffs; also denying defendants'
[request] ... that the plaintiffs pay one-half the costs of scanning documents [i]nto electronic
form in favor of requiring plaintiffs "to pay the nominal cost of duplicating compact discs.").
See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2017(c)-(d), 2025(g), (o), 2031(f), (in), 2033(e), (I) (West
2002) ("[G]ood faith attempt at an informal resolution" required by, among other provisions);
CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 2017(e) (West 2002), ("[plursuant to noticed motion, a court may
enter orders for the use of technology in conducting discovery in cases designated as
complex"). See generally Richard E. Best (SF Super. Ct. Discovery Commissioner), Meet and
Confer, CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY (1999), at
http://califomiadiscovery.findlaw.com/MEETANDCONFERWEB.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
179. A discovery issue beyond the scope of this Essay is the ability to take depositions
over the Internet. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") expressly provide that "[t]he
parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion order that a deposition be taken by
telephone or other remote electronic means." FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(7); See also Vt. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(7). "Increasingly, parties are conducting depositions by remote electronic means due to
improved technologies and both time and financial constraints, particularly when the nature of
the testimony or other factors do not require the personal attendance of the attorney. Effective
2002, such practices are expressly authorized by [California] statute." Richard E. Best (San
Francisco Superior Court Discovery Commissioner), Virtual Discovery Conducting Discovery
in a Web Centric Environment, CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY, at
http://califomiadiscovery.findlaw.com/IntemetDiscovery.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002)
(citing CAL. C1V. PROC. CODE § 2025(h)(3) ("[a] person may take, and any person other than the
deponent may attend, a deposition by telephone or other remote electronic means.")).
In addition to Vermont and California, at least 15 other "states have rules governing
video depositions, according to the National Center for State Courts." Rebecca Porter, The Next
Step: Taking Depositions Online, TRIAL MAGAZINE, Aug. 2001, at http:/i-
dep.com/news/trial_8-0l.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). Some vendors that apparently provide
Internet deposition services include I-DEP and Depocast.com. Richard E. Best, Web Sites re
Web Centric Discovery, CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY
at http://califomiadiscovery.findlaw.com/lnternetDiscovery.htm#WEBSITES (last visited Oct.
22, 2002) (listing several other vendors and their homepages).
By using some real time deposition transcript services, all parties to a deposition can
view the transcript of the testimony as it is being given, in addition to seeing it on video or
hearing it via conferencing telephone hookups.
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A cautionary tale as to the pitfalls of delaying discussion of the
logistics of computer discovery emerges from Danis v. USN
Communications.180 In the case, the court criticized the parties for
their failure to communicate or to gain "a complete mastery of what
types of documents were generated by [the defendant] in the ordinary
course of business, how they were used, or their significance."
' 181
c. Details of the Opponent's Computer System
Specific, well-thought-out and thorough requests for electronic
data should be made as early in the litigation as possible. Thus, to
prevent the kind of prejudicial delay that doomed the Goord
plaintiffs, you should follow the wise course of initially serving
interrogatories, and then following up with a document request and/or
a deposition notice accompanied by a list of requested documents and
data. Interrogatories can be used to obtain preliminary information
about the layout of an opponent's computer system, including
hardware, software, software applications, back-ups, e-mail and
voicemail administration, and similar issues. When follow-up
questions flow from the interrogatory responses, and/or when the
location and/or amount of computer data are important, you can then
notice the deposition(s) of person(s) with knowledge, such as the
Information Technology Director. In federal court Rule 30(b)(6)
depositions can be used to avoid using up many of the allowed
depositions. 182
A deposition would be particularly useful if, for example, the
other side is resistant to the notion of electronic discovery and/or you
have reason to believe all responsive electronic information has not
been produced in response to a prior discovery request. More
broadly, however, some courts have expressly approved the use of
depositions to learn about a party's computer system and electronic
information. 183
180. Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16900 (N.D. I11. Oct.
23, 2000).
181. Id. at *13-14. See also Jones v. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, at *48 (denying
electronic discovery request deemed "belated" and "speculative" due to six year delay and lack
of a specific-let alone expert-based-discovery plan).
182. A 30(b)(6) deposition counts as only one deposition regardless of the number of
persons designated by a party serving a 30(b)(6) notice. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(b)(6). Thus,
30(b)(6) depositions are outside the scope of the "leave of court" a party must obtain to exceed
the ten deposition limit set by FRCP Rule 30(a)(2)(A), and Rule 31 (d)(2)(A) ("Deposition Upon
Written Questions").
183. See In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 155 F.R.D. 209, 213 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (denying defendants' motions to quash FRCP Rule 30(b)(6) notices for depositions
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Third parties may possess electronic information of a party. For
example, a third party may administer a company's Internet or
intranet service, and/or may possess back-ups of e-mails. In the era of
increasingly used Application Service Providers (ASP's) and multi-
faceted web services, 184 this consideration is now even more
important than ever. A third party consultant may have been used to
administer system back-ups, and may thus possess copies of back-up
tapes. In either event, you might consider subpoenaing electronic
information in the possession of the third party.185
The existence of an alternative source can severely undercut a
motion to compel production of electronic data from a party. For
instance, one court found that the prejudice to the plaintiffs resulting
from the defendants' failure to produce information from a database
was mitigated by the plaintiffs' ability to obtain that information from
a third party. 186  And another court denied an emergency ex parte
application for a temporary restraining order to prevent anticipated
destruction and concealment of computer files, ruling that
"[p]laintiffs' own complaint and.., application reveal[ ] ample
alternative sources of proof."
1 87
4. Parameters of Seeking Court Intervention
If you cannot reach a compromise and the other side is refusing
to produce electronic information, then take action promptly.
Especially in this era of XML-generated websites and database
proliferation, electronic data is rarely static. Such data is dynamic,
and is constantly modified, deleted and/or compromised. If there are
technical issues in dispute, carefully consider the information and
education the court will need to decide those issues. If the existence
of the requested information is at issue, marshal your evidence to
regarding their computer systems; those depositions were "to identify how data is maintained
and to determine what hardware and software is necessary to access the information[,] are
preliminary depositions necessary to proceed with merits discovery."). But see Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 122 F.R.D. 567, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(denying request for information about a party's computer system, absent evidence that the party
had failed to respond to discovery requests adequately and in good faith).
184. For a discussion of web services, see Questra, Web Services in Embedded Systems,
WHITE PAPER (July 2001), at
http://www.questra.com/literature/whitepapers/web-serviceswp.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
185. Third party services are sometimes used for on-line meetings and remote
presentations. Records of such services can be valuable in proving such meetings occurred and
providing a basis for inquiring about what occurred at such meetings.
186. Danis, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16900, at *78. See also Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D.
29, 37, vacated, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606 (2002).
187. Adobe Sys., Inc. v. South Sun Prods., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636, 643 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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show that the information exists and that your request is not a fishing
expedition. Carefully limit your requests to information you really
need. In addition, to help reduce the time and effort involved,
consider practical limits on searches (e.g., date restrictions, limitations
to certain search terms and/or, if appropriate, limitations to computers
used by a reasonable list of pertinent individuals). For voluminous
electronic databases, the requesting party might ask for searches of
the databases using specific key word searches. If the parties cannot
agree upon the nature and scope of those searches, let alone their key
words, they can ask the court to resolve the impasse.1
8 8
If a defendant proves uncooperative in discovery, a court may be
more receptive to a plaintiffs request for extensive electronic
discovery.189 For instance, in Tulip v. Dell Computer Corporation, a
patent case, the court granted the plaintiffs customized discovery
request that the defendant make its senior executives' e-mail records
available, after having an opportunity to address privilege and
confidentiality concerns. 190 The plaintiffs proposed procedure was
deemed "fair, efficient, and reasonable."' 91 The defendant had to
"provide the e-mails from the hard disks of the identified executives
in electronic form to [Plaintiffs consultant,]" who would "search the
e-mails based on an agreed upon list of search terms."' 92 The plaintiff
was directed to give the defendant a list of e-mails containing those
terms, but was not to read the e-mails until the defendant had an
188. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 179 F.R.D. at 632 (of 25 proposed search terms allowed
by magistrate judge: certain word searches were too narrow, leaving out discoverable and
relevant subjects; and another was overly broad, thus reaching into non-discoverable matters or
yielding so much information as to be "unwieldy for any purpose legitimately within the current
framework of the litigation"). See also Alexander v. FBI, 194 F.R.D. 316 (D.D.C. 2002) (in
"Filegate" case, narrowing Plaintiffs request to search more than 50 individuals' e-mail via 37
proposed search terms to 33 individuals via 20 search terms).
189. See Tulip Computers Int'l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792
(D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002).
190. Id. at * 18-19. The court's rationale was that:
The history of [defendant's] failures to cooperate in the discovery process - and
its sweeping but inaccurate positions that [plaintiff] would never find certain
documents that [plaintiff], through persistence and diligence, later uncovered -
counsel in favor of awarding [plaintiff] some relief that allows them to ascertain
for themselves whether [defendant's] representations that all responsive
documents have been produced are accurate. Moreover, counsel for [defendant]
could not represent to the court that it has thoroughly searched these e-mail
records for responsive information.
Id. at *19.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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opportunity to review them to ensure that privilege and confidentiality
concerns were not compromised.
93
A court may also partially grant a request for information stored
in a database. In a racial discrimination class action, plaintiffs-all
African American women-were searched by Customs following
their arrival at Chicago's 0' Hare International Airport on
international flights. 194 To support their various claims, the plaintiffs
sought to discover "the names and addresses of passengers included
in [one of four] computer database[s] ... provided during [previous]
discovery."' 195 The plaintiffs contended that they needed additional
information about persons who were searched by Customs officials
but not arrested or subject to seizure of objects (a "Negative Search").
Plaintiffs asserted that the other data was needed for "certain
statistical analysis.0 96 Plaintiffs also sought to contact a sampling of
nonparty passengers to interview them about their Customs treatment.
The court ordered the defendants to "provide [passengers'] names,
birth dates, and addresses" subjected to Negative Searches, but forbid
all parties from "contact[ing] any of the nonparty passengers
disclosed in any of the computer databases.' 9 7
5. Assessing the Adequacy of Opponent's Electronic
Production
Test the adequacy of your opponent's search efforts and
production. At a deposition, ask the witness whether he or she:
* searched his or her computer and to delineate the types of
information stored thereon;
* was instructed to preserve information, including
electronic information.
* possesses floppy disks, jaz disks, zip disks, flash memory
devices and/or CD-ROM's containing pertinent
information;
* uses a laptop and/or other home computer for work
193. Id.
194. Anderson v. Cornejo. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2330 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2001).
195. Id. at *9.
196. Id. at *16.
197. Id. at *24-25.
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purposes.
Ask about the configuration of deponent's computer or
workstation-what it is used for and what information is saved to a
storage device. Also inquire to identify all others, such as assistants,
secretaries, or other persons, who have retained and still retain the
deponent's electronic information.
B. Tips for Responding to Electronic Information Production
Requests
1. Respond to Preservation Requests
It is wise to respond promptly to a preservation letter, including
your specific objections and inquiring about the basis for the demand.
You might consider seeking a protective order if your opponent's
requests appear excessive or unreasonable.
2. Advising Client of Duties to Preserve and Communicate
It is advisable to inform your client of the duty to preserve
evidence, and to explain the potential categories of discoverable
information, including electronic information. Depending upon the
size of your client and the circumstances, it may be advisable for a
company officer to communicate with the employees about the
lawsuit-as well as the obligation to preserve all forms of
information. This communication should outline the categories of
documents and other information to be retained. The request to
preserve should be unequivocal, and, if appropriate, should explain
the consequences of a failure to preserve, including penalties and
sanctions. Such an explanation is even more warranted by virtue of
the possibility-noted supra in section II(A)(1)(c)-that a court might
hold a corporate officer personally responsible for a corporation's
failure to preserve relevant evidence.
3. Inventory and Search Your Client's Computer System
Assess your client's computer system. It would be helpful to
understand the layout and structure of the computer system, as well as
the locations and sources of electronic information. If there are
numerous sources of electronic information, you may need to devise a
strategy for searching electronic information (on the network and
individual hard drives). For organizational purposes and in
anticipation of a subsequent dispute, it would be helpful to keep track
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of your electronic search efforts. You may eventually be pressed to
show the steps taken to preserve, collect, and extract responsive
information.
Determine the persons who may have discoverable or relevant
information. You should search for and preserve the electronic data
of the persons who were, or are, involved in the matters at issue,
including, for example, persons:
* identified in the pleadings, witness lists, and
initial/mandatory disclosures; and
* who may appear as deponents or maybe also as trial
witnesses.
In Procter & Gamble, monetary sanctions were imposed against
the plaintiff for failing to search or preserve the e-mail
communications of five key employees whom the plaintiff had
identified as having relevant information.' 98 That case serves as a
reminder to involve information custodians in the preservation and
searching processes. Expect that, when a custodian is deposed, he or
she will be asked questions about the efforts undertaken to search for
and produce responsive documents.
4. Consider Retaining Back-Up Tapes
Consider whether your client should change its standard back-up
routines. Even if back-up tapes have not been specifically requested,
consider whether they are called for by document requests (examine
the opponent's definition of "documents"). Your client might
consider removing back-up tapes from the recycling rotation to
preserve them for the litigation. Each back-up tape will provide a
snapshot of the computer system on a given day. In addition, upon a
specific request for back-up tapes, you may ultimately need to advise
your client on whether they should agree to produce them. If your
client does not agree to produce such tapes, inform the other side,
providing an explanation. If a compromise cannot be reached, ask the
court to resolve the dispute.
198. Procter & Gamble, 179 F.R.D. at 632 (such failure "constitute[d] a sanctionable
breach of P&G's discovery duties[;] P&G's own identification of these individuals belies any
possible claim that P&G was not on notice that their e-mail communications would be
relevant").
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In some cases, discovery of back-up tapes may be overly
burdensome and/or unnecessary. Back-up tapes might be unavailable,
or the volume of back-ups may be very large given the size of the
company. The expense of restoring, searching, and extracting
information from back-up tapes may be excessive compared to the
size of the case. If your matter falls into one of those categories, you
might pursue a strategy entailing an ongoing thorough search for, and
preservation of, pertinent electronic data. Such an approach could
minimize or eliminate the need for discovery of back-up tapes.
5. Secure Information; Establish its Authentication
Foundation
You will need to lay the foundation for the authenticity of
computer records you plan to introduce in evidence, namely that:
* the information has not been changed;
* it is a complete copy;
* it was made by a reliable copying method; and
* the media have been secured (i.e., the original copies have
been preserved).
Whether electronic information was produced by your side or
received from the other side, you should carefully track not only its
sources, but also the methods by which it was obtained. Make write-
protected copies of original data. Run anti-virus checks. 199 Store
originals in a secure place-i.e., a place of limited and controlled
access-to avoid the possibility of data corruption via alteration or
destruction.2 00  Be conscious of the impact of stipulated or court-
ordered protective procedures.
6. Considerations Regarding Copying or Inspecting Hard
Drives
If the other side wishes to search a hard drive or copy it, first
consider whether it has a legitimate, well-founded basis for doing so:
199. Donald Searles, Essentials of Electronic Discovery: What Every Practitioner Must
Know, Cal. CEB Power Point presentation (March 2002) (on file with author).
200. Id.
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" Is the request premature?
* Is there a particular reason for the search?
" Are there less burdensome ways to address the requesting
party's concerns and its rationale for request?
If you and your client are amenable to such a search, try to agree
on a protocol for the search process. Determine who will bear the
costs of copying, searching, screening, and production. Use a
screening procedure to protect non-responsive documents plus those
protected by work product and/or attorney client privilege.20'
IV. USING COMPUTER EXPERTS TO AID IN DISCOVERY AND TO
ASSIST/SWAY THE COURT
A. Benefits of Retaining a Computer Forensics Expert
If a large amount of electronic information is significant to a
given case, consider early retention of a computer forensics firm to
assist in the searching, collection, and production of that information.
Such a firm may help streamline the process and plan a strategy for
discovery and production of electronic information. However, these
experts can be costly. Therefore, you should assess your client's
needs and resources when weighing the potential benefits against the
anticipated significant costs.
Expert testimony is also important if electronic discovery "meet
and confer" negotiations reach an impasse. It is helpful in
establishing or disproving whether the burdens of the requested
discovery are outweighed by the benefits of obtaining information
otherwise unavailable or in an inaccessible format. The lack of an
expert may preclude court enforcement of what might otherwise
qualify as a valid discovery request.20 Electronic discovery presents
numerous complex logistical issues. It also entails intrusion into, and
risks to the integrity and stability of, the target computer systems. If
the parties must seek court intervention on such issues, they often will
wish to educate the court on the technical issues via expert testimony.
The requesting party must be prepared to demonstrate the basis for
201. See, e.g., Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55.
202. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, at *40-41.
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seeking the information; why it is expected to yield otherwise
unavailable, discoverable information; and how the risks of harm and
inconvenience can be minimized.
B. Relative Expertise of Opposing Experts
An expert witness with sufficient computer expertise should
provide a detailed explanation of the technical issues, such as how
data might be obtained from the computer system and the likelihood
that responsive information will be found.2 °3 The prevailing party in
an electronic discovery dispute may be the one whose expert has
better credentials and/or a more detailed explanation of his or her
204client's position.
In a trade secret misappropriation dispute, the court focused on
the opposing experts' relative credentials in assessing various
sanction requests arising from the plaintiffs former employee's
destruction of word processing files.20 5  Plaintiff had hired a
technician, whose credentials, experience, and knowledge were
inferior to those of the defendants' retained expert, who had a Ph.D.
in computer science from Stanford University. Consequently, the
court placed far greater weight on the defendant's expert's testimony
when assessing, and ultimately denying, the plaintiffs request for a
default judgment.0 6
203. New York State NOW v. Cuomo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10520, *9 (where "no
[plaintiffs'] expert testimony describing in detail what would have been required," rejecting as
speculative plaintiffs' prejudicial delay contention-namely that delayed notice of destruction of
database had precluded them from being able to enlist computer experts to un-delete the
information); Anti Monopoly, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at *8 (if parties are not able to
resolve dispute about burden involved in compiling electronic data into report, they should
submit follow-up motion, including affidavits from computer personnel or computer experts).
See also Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526,(rejecting request to copy defendant's
hard drive to determine creation date of allegedly back-dated termination memo because
plaintiff's computer expert could raise only possibility of achieving such determination).
204. One case in which the relative merits of conflicting experts were dispositive was
Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 669 So.2d 1142, rev. denied, 805 So.2d 810 (Fla. 2001). There,
Plaintiff sought information previously purged from [D]efendant's computer system. Plaintiff
submitted an affidavit of a CPA without any particular computer expertise. The CPA averred
that it was "possible" to retrieve purged information. In contrast, Defendant's expert, a
computer engineer, investigated the pertinent hardware and software, including the operation of
the purging function. He examined the computer system for purged files, finding none.
Weighing the competing experts' testimony, the court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to
establish likelihood that the purged documents could be retrieved. Id. at 1145. See also
Alexander, 188 F.R.D. at I11.
205. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 110-11 (D. Colo. 1996).
206. Id. at l l.
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Additionally, the plaintiffs computer technician had bungled the
copying of the pertinent hard drive, which he was using to search for
deleted files. The court had ordered the defendants to produce the
plaintiffs former employee's computer to allow copying of the hard
drive to obtain all available information regarding the deleted files.
To compound the plaintiffs relatively weak position, its technician's
attempt to recapture deleted, but not yet been overwritten, files had
been ineffective.
20 7
On the merits of plaintiffs spoliation sanctions motion,
plaintiff's "challenge to the adequacy of the computer record...
being provided" was justified by the former employee's destruction of
computer files.208 Yet, the plaintiffs expert's incompetence had
ironically resulted in independent spoliation. Thus, the court awarded
only ten percent of the fees and costs it incurred throughout the
sanctions proceedings.
20 9
V. CONCLUSION
As does its companion Essay on efiling, this Essay raises more
questions than it answers. Just how far must each side go to preserve
evidence? How far may each go to hunt for evidence? Courts are
grappling with these issues, though there are not yet clear-cut rules
with broad applicability. Given today's burgeoning computer
forensics capabilities and the increasing volume of electronic data
being generated, 210 the breadth of electronic discovery-and of the
legal issues it implicates-can be overwhelming.
Reciprocity can act as a check on unreasonable and premature
requests for intensive electronic discovery. When the parties are both
businesses and/or the electronic discovery burdens weigh similarly on
each side, there is an element of mutually assured destruction.
Be mindful that the law is constantly evolving and there are few
207. Plaintiffs technician attempted to do the copying with an un-erase application. First,
he unnecessarily made a copy of the pertinent program. Thus, even before commencing file-
deletion, he overwrote seven to eight percent of the hard drive. The technician did not obtain
the creation dates of some files that overwrote deleted files. That information would have
helped determine some key deletion dates. As discussed in section 1(C) above, post-Gates case
law established a procedure whereby a neutral, third-party expert copies each relevant hard
drive.
208. Id. at ll3.
209. Id. Ironically, the failure to obtain the creation dates constituted spoliation that
defendants used to resist plaintiff's spoliation allegations against defendants.
210. See Lyman & Varian, supra note 2. "The world produces between 1 and 2 exabytes
of unique information per year, which is roughly 250 megabytes for every man, woman, and
child on earth. An exabyte is a billion gigabytes, or 108 bytes." Id.
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absolute rules. But here are some suggestions to help keep your client
in synch with electronic discovery rights and obligations:
(a) early on in litigation, inform the other side of the electronic
information discovery you will be seeking and request that such
information be preserved;
(b) promptly respond to a similar request from the other side, and
inform it of any questions or objections;
(c) engage in a good faith dialogue with the other side, aiming to
reach an early consensus about the desired scope of electronic
discovery and the relevant expectations of each side;
(d) do not wait for a document request or a preservation letter or
order; at the beginning of a dispute or case, start the process of
searching for and collecting electronic information;
(e) ensure that your client and its employees are aware of the
obligation to preserve evidence and the consequences of
destruction, and advise them to communicate the attendant duties
to the appropriate people;
(f) in responding to discovery requests and conducting searches,
ensure your discovery efforts are above reproach; and
(g) choose your battles wisely; if you must seek the court's
intervention, provide the court with all the information and
explanation (including a well-credentialed expert) it will need to
consider the salient issue(s).
The authors believe that, because of its volume, electronic
information eventually will result in significant changes in discovery
rules and procedures. Both the federal and state court systems are
currently exploring the discovery implications of electronic
information. At the federal level, the Discovery Subcommittee of the
United States Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is assessing
whether the nature of electronic information warrants proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Subcommittee's inquiry regarding the impact of computer-based
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materials is being coordinated by Special Consultant Richard L.
Marcus, a Professor at UC Hastings College of Law.21 1 In addition, at
the state level, a National Center for State Courts (NCSC) project has
been approved and funded. The Task Force for the NCSC project is
being formed by the appointed project director Mary Durkin.
212
211. Richard L. Marcus, Is There a Need for Rule Changes to Address Distinctive
Features of Discovery of Electronic Materials?, National Center for State Courts (Sept. 2002)
212. National Center for State Courts, Discovery of Electronic Evidence In State Court
Civil Litigation, (Dec. 2001). This draft project proposal is "not for publication." (on file with
author).
